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Darwin’s theory of natural selection has played a central role in the development of the
biological sciences, but evolution can also explain change in human culture. Institutions,
mechanisms that govern behavior and social order, are important subjects of cultural evolution.
Institutions can help stabilize cooperation, defined as behavior that benefits others, often at a
personal cost. Cooperation is important for solving social dilemmas, scenarios in which the
interests of the individual conflict with those of the group. A number of mechanisms by which
institutions evolve to support cooperation have been identified, yet theoretical models of
institutional change have rarely been applied to local food institutions, which may be sustained
by cooperation (Ikerd, 2012; Renting, Schermer, & Rossi, 2012; Tremblay & Waring, 2015).
This thesis poses the general question, how do local food institutions and organizations evolve?
Chapter one uses a macro-evolutionary framework to explore the emergence and spread
of two local food policies over time and space. First, I demonstrate how the rapid proliferation of
cottage food laws in the U.S. is consistent with positive selection pressure at the individual,
group, and state levels. Second, I illustrate how social learning and group transmission played a
key role in the spread and diffusion of a municipal food sovereignty ordinance in Maine,

ultimately changing selection pressure at the state level and amplifying town-level adoption.
Finally, I offer concluding thoughts about the application of this framework to similar cases,
including the propagation of single-use plastic bag bans.
Chapter two serves as a micro-evolutionary analysis of organizational change in food
buying clubs, small organizations which use collective purchasing power to obtain bulk
quantities of organic, local, and specialty foods. Since these groups require cooperation from
members through order-sharing and shared work tasks, I hypothesize that successful clubs
possess traits which allow them to sustain cooperation and overcome social dilemmas. I predict
that club members will be cooperative toward their groups, and that successful clubs will
exercise generalized reciprocity and adopt rules to stabilize cooperation. Data from online
surveys, experimental economic games, and phone interviews were analyzed using mixed
methods to identify patterns of cooperation in groups. My results provide general support for my
hypothesis that successful clubs have adaptations suited to overcome challenges. Specifically, I
find that 1) buying club members are especially cooperative toward their groups when compared
to other populations, 2) clubs exercise reciprocity in order-sharing, 3) reciprocity itself may not
be a group adaptation, but group size is sufficient to support reciprocity in clubs, and 4) the
adoption of rules is likely a key factor in club success and longevity. Finally, I offer practical
advice for buying club management and operation.
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CHAPTER 1
LOCAL FOOD POLICY & AUTONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS
Introduction
In the period following the Second World War, rapid technological advancement led to
an increase in the use of agricultural pesticides, fertilizers, and new strains of high yield crops
around the world (Pingali, 2012). Known as “The Green Revolution,” this era brought
tremendous growth in agricultural output and helped to forge a new global food economy.
Pioneers of this revolution were praised for alleviating hunger. Most notably Norman Borlaug
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970 for his efforts to fight food insecurity by developing
highly modernized agricultural systems of much larger scale than traditional systems (Hesser &
Carter, 2006). While such systems are extremely efficient, providing an abundance of highcalorie foods at low costs to consumers, they have also given rise to many concerns including
negative human health impacts, loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services, climate change, and
new challenges for small-scale farming operations and local food systems (Pollan, 2006). Recent
interest in small-scale, local, and sustainable food provision is largely motivated by increasing
public concern about industrial, commodity-driven food systems, as in the U.S. and other nations
around the world (Oosterveer, Sonnenfeld, & Sonnenfeld, 2012).
The recent surge in consumer demand for locally-produced food in the U.S. is rooted in
the movement toward a more resilient, sustainable, community-governed food system (Martinez,
2010). Organizations including farmers’ markets, food hubs, buying clubs, food co-ops, and
community-supported agriculture (CSA) expand consumer choices and allow for more
democratic participation in the food system (Renting et al., 2012). These business models
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provide alternatives to traditional markets, strengthening consumer freedom of choice and
helping communities build a sense of autonomy over their food production. The U.S. local food
movement is also closely related to the global movement toward food sovereignty, defined as
“the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically
sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems”
(“What is Food Sovereignty,” 2013). The food sovereignty movement has been gaining
momentum since the 1990s when it was pioneered by members of La Vía Campesina, an
international organization of farmers dedicated to advocating for peasant rights, sustainable food
production, and global food security. Activists have described food sovereignty as a movement
away from the global, neoliberal, industrial food system toward a more just, sustainable, and
localized system (Patel, 2009; Shiva, 2005). Since the 1990s, formal declarations of food
sovereignty have been spreading and diffusing from rural to urban areas around the world
(McMichael, 2014). The Food Sovereignty movement outlines broad policy goals for national
governments and other political bodies, including equitable land ownership, property rights
reform, farmer rights to save seed, fair prices for producers and consumers, subsidies for smallscale producers and workers, increased funding for agricultural extension services, and citizen
involvement in policy design and implementation (Pimbert, 2009). Seven countries have adopted
formal food sovereignty legislation, including Ecuador, Venezuela, Mali, Bolivia, Nepal,
Senegal, and Egypt (Wittman, Desmarais, & Wiebe, 2010). While the United States has yet to
adopt food sovereignty legislation at the federal level, there is evidence that related policies have
been emerging and spreading at the municipal and state levels, which will be explored further in
this chapter.
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In the U.S., the food sovereignty movement has manifested in the widespread adoption of
cottage food laws, which aim to support small-scale producers of low-risk, shelf-stable food
items by exempting them from state regulations (Rice, Leib, & Balkus, 2018). Cottage food laws
have been taken a step further in states such as Wyoming, which passed the “Food Freedom Act”
in 2015 and recently amended it to exempt the in-state production and sale of meat products from
regulation (Food Freedom Act-Amendments, 2017). North Dakota was the second state to adopt
similar legislation in 2017, and Utah passed a more restrictive version in 2018 (Sibilla, 2019).
The state of Maine has recently experienced the spread of a municipal food sovereignty
ordinance, which exempts the local sale of raw and perishable items from state licensure and
inspection. This municipal ordinance has spread rapidly across the state since 2011 (St. Peter,
2011), and was reinforced by the state’s adoption of the Maine Food Sovereignty Act in 2017
(Bayly, 2017). The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the process of policy evolution across
multiple levels of governance by studying the emergence and spread of cottage food laws in the
U.S. and food sovereignty ordinances in Maine.
Economic Conditions & Policy Considerations
Increasing efficiency in the agriculture sector has created challenging economic
conditions for small and mid-size farms, which have been experiencing a long term decline in the
U.S. since the period following the Green Revolution (Wadley, 1985). The share of total annual
farm sales generated by small farming operations (generating less than $250,000 in sales) has
rapidly declined, with small farms accounting for only 14 percent of sales in 2007, down from 41
percent in 1982 (Hoppe, 2010). The Green Revolution, in tandem with commodity-focused
government subsidies, has created a path-dependent food system in the U.S. where the increasing
need to maximize efficiency through industrial practices has stymied the growth and success of
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small-scale, diversified farms (Gowdy & Baveye, 2018; Iles & Marsh, 2012). Mid-size farms,
known as “agriculture of the middle,” may face an even steeper challenge in this economic
climate because they are not well suited for bulk commodity production or in-person sale of
specialty items (Thompson & Gaskin, 2018).
Policymakers have been challenged to offer solutions that help small-scale food
industries thrive in these economic conditions. At the federal level, the Farm Bill includes key
provisions for local food, including planning and implementation grants (Starmer, 2017),
expansion of EBT benefits to farmers’ markets, and support for research in areas like organic
farming, farmland stewardship, crop innovation (“SNAP in the Farm Bill”). Local food policies
have also been spreading at the state level. For example, Maine’s L.D. 1584 was signed into law
in 2018, requiring all Maine government institutions (except local schools) to source 20 percent
of food from local producers by 2025 (Strout, 2018). This act was inspired by many higher
education institutions, which have recently pledged to source a certain percent of foods locally
by a given date (Pols, 2018).
A grassroots movement toward food sovereignty has also emerged at the municipal and
state levels in the form of deregulation. The movement toward the deregulation of local food is a
direct response to the 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), which sought to reduce
foodborne illness outbreaks by expanding the FDA’s authority on food production, harvest, and
processing (Food Safety Modernization Act, 2011). Proponents of deregulation argue that the
FSMA favors industrial systems and undermines small-scale farmers by imposing crippling costs
with respect to licensing and inspection (Kurtz, 2015). The enactment of the FSMA, coupled
with the 2008 recession which led to the rise of the gig economy (Friedman, 2014), created
conditions ripe for the spread of cottage food and food sovereignty legislation in the early 2010s.
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The pressure to generate additional income streams rose during the recession, which spurred
growth in the cottage food industry (Burger, 2017). Contrary to other industries, the local food
industry has continued to grow in the period following the 2008 recession. Between 2007 and
2015, the number of farmers’ markets in the U.S. grew 180 percent, the number of food hubs
increased threefold, and farm-to-school programs grew 430 percent (Low, 2015). This trend
suggests that local food institutions can be resilient and even thrive during times of economic
downturn.
The neoclassical economic view offers insight into some of the driving forces behind the
spread of cottage food and food sovereignty legislation. Rational choice theory holds that the
collective behavior of a society is driven by individual, utility-maximizing choices (Blume &
Easley, 2008). Neoclassical economists might argue that municipalities and states, seeking to
maximize benefits, will adopt legislation at based upon local industry needs and comparative
advantages. For instance, because cottage food laws reduce costs for small home bakers, states
with larger home baking industries might be more likely to adopt such policies. In the case of the
food sovereignty ordinance, which reduces costs for small farms, towns with more small farms
may be more likely to adopt this type of policy than those with large farming operations or no
farming industry at all. Economic theory helps explain the choice of whether or not to adopt
certain legislation, given the associated benefits and costs. However, this approach does not
necessarily help explain how policies might spread via social learning between individuals and
groups.
Policy Diffusion
Recent literature examining the mechanisms of policy emergence and spread represents a
departure from the more traditional, top-down legislation framework. The growing body of
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literature on multilevel governance, particularly in the natural resource management context,
emphasizes the importance of decision-making at every level from local organizations to global
institutions (Lang, Barling, & Caraher, 2001; Nelson & Winter, 2002; Piattoni, 2009;
Stephenson, 2013). Research has shown that “local-level governments can evolve into a resilient
collaboration of multi-level governance when national institutions recognize the importance of
smaller governance units and work with them rather than destroying them" (Ostrom & Janssen,
2005). Other work has focused on analyzing the specific mechanisms of policy spread and
diffusion across different levels of governance. Policy diffusion is the idea that states and
localities may serve as “policy laboratories” which aid in the geographical and hierarchical
spread of policies. Political scientists have been studying and debating the mechanisms of policy
spread and diffusion for decades (Shipan & Volden, 2006, 2006; Tews, 2005; Tews, Busch, &
Jörgens, 2003). Shipan and Volden observed three mechanisms of policy diffusion: learning
from, competing with, and imitating other entities, as well as being coerced by state
governments. Tews’ work has focused on environmental policy diffusion at the international
level, as well as the diffusion of ideas in the field and policy convergence.
Framework: Cultural Multilevel Selection Theory
Building on the policy diffusion literature, I propose the use of an evolutionary
framework to add explanatory and predictive value to the case of food autonomy laws in the
United States. Anthropologists, psychologists and economists have used the generalized
framework of adaptive evolution to identify patterns in individual and group behavior over time
and develop causal mechanistic explanations and predictive tools. Natural selection, the process
by which adaptive evolution occurs, requires three elements: variation, transmission, and
selection. Variation is defined as differences among traits in individuals, transmission or heredity
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is the passing on of traits from one generation to the next, and selection is the differential
survival and/or reproduction of individuals due to trait variation (Darwin, 1859). Adaptive
evolution is distinguished from genetic drift, or random fluctuations in a trait due to chance
variation in random copying (Hahn & Bentley, 2003). While Darwin’s work was largely
predicated on individual-level selection, he conjectured that natural selection may also operate
on ethical principles (Darwin, 1859), hinting at the concept of cultural evolution via group-level
selection (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010). The theory of group selection describes the evolutionary
process by which intergroup competition drives group-advantageous behavior, often leading
more cooperative groups to outcompete less cooperative ones. This theory paved the way for the
development of Multilevel Selection Theory (MLS), which suggests that the Darwinian
principles of variation, transmission and selection operate at numerous levels from genes, to
cells, to organisms, and groups of organisms (Wilson & Wilson, 2007).
Cultural evolution uses Darwinian principles to explain how language and institutions
function as social mechanisms of inheritance or units of replication (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland,
2004). Similar to the way genes are passed down from one generation to the next, cultural traits
including languages, music, art, tools, technologies, and religions are transmitted through
cultural inheritance, peer influence, parent-offspring correlations, and descent in culture.
Multilevel selection recognizes that in theory, selection can happen at any level. The level at
which selection is strongest is known as the dominant level of selection (Okasha, 2006).
Evolutionary Social Science as a Tool for Policy Analysis
The value of evolutionary social science is that it ties together the most useful elements
from economics, psychology, and anthropology into one framework driven by observable
biological principles (Gintis, 2014). It is unrealistic to expect the social sciences to converge to
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one general understanding, given their fragmented nature. In fact, disciplines are more likely to
diverge from one another, underscoring the need for a unifying framework (Wilson & Gowdy,
2013). Applying an evolutionary framework to the social sciences adds great richness to our
collective understanding of who we are, how we became this way, and how we can make
decisions today to better our prospects in the future.
There are many tools from evolution that can be applied to political science. Leveraging
intergroup competition, for instance, can be used in policy analysis and development. Henrich
(2015) explains how different forms of intergroup competition, including differential group
survival (successful groups survive in harsh environments), migration (successful groups grow
through immigration), reproduction (successful groups grow through reproduction), and prestigebased between-group learning (individuals learn from other individuals in successful groups),
drive the spread and evolution of culture. Understanding how culture evolves can help
policymakers identify conditions which may support or hinder the spread and diffusion of
policies across time and space.
The use of evolutionary principles to help explain the emergence and adoption of policies
over time has been utilized in a handful of studies. Waring and Acheson (2018) implement a
rubric for cultural group selection to analyze the history of lobster fishing laws and regulations
on the coast of Maine, including the v-notch law, escape-vent law, and voluntary trap limits. The
authors identified between-group imitation and learning as the dominant mechanisms of group
selection in this context, suggesting the adoption of lobster fishing policy is largely a social
phenomenon among harvesters, managers and other key stakeholders in the industry. The case of
the Maine lobster industry provides an example of the value of multilevel selection for
understanding policy evolution. Waring et al. (2015) develop a multilevel evolutionary
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framework for analyzing sustainability behavior and policy. Here, I will use this framework to
study two cases of local food policy diffusion. Following Waring et al. (2015), I will track
evolutionary factors in each case by detailing the focal trait, policy environment, history, and
levels of selection.
Case Study Analyses
Focal Trait: Cottage Food Laws in the U.S.
Cottage food laws across the United States seek to support local food systems by
exempting cottage food operations from food safety regulations and licensing. Cottage food
operations are small, in-home kitchens run by individuals who sell and market their products
locally. While cottage food laws vary from state to state, the term “cottage food” typically
includes non-hazardous or shelf-stable items like baked goods, jams and other preserved foods,
dry baking mixes, granola, popcorn, and candies. These laws generally do not provide
protections for raw meat, dairy, eggs, or other perishable items. While the food sovereignty
movement and related “food freedom” laws are generally more comprehensive by allowing the
sale of raw and perishable items, cottage food laws provide opportunities for small-scale,
artisanal, and local food businesses to thrive.
Policy Environment. The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution grants all states the right
to regulate the intrastate production and sale of foods. While the federal government maintains
control of interstate commerce, foods produced and consumed within state lines are regulated by
the states themselves (Rice et al., 2018). The adoption of cottage food laws across U.S. states
over the last thirty years has been driven in large part by growing demand for locally-produced
foods. Locally-produced food sales rose from $5 billion in 2008 to $12 billion in 2014, a trend
which is expected to continue by reaching $20 billion by 2019 (Vilsack, 2016).
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History. The first cottage food law in the U.S. was passed in Vermont in 1951, with Maine and
New York later adopting similar laws in 1980. Cottage food law data collected from
LawAtlas.org (2017) and the Harvard Law School Food Law and Policy Clinic (2018) show that
these laws continued to spread across jurisdictions throughout the 1990s, and gained momentum
in the late 2000s and 2010s. From 2007-2012, an average of five states per year adopted some
type of cottage food law (Burger, 2017). As of 2018, all U.S. states except for New Jersey have
adopted some type of cottage food law which aims to protect small-scale food businesses (Rice
et al., 2018). The spread of these laws appears to be partly determined by geographical
proximity, spreading from the Northeast, to the Midwest, and finally to the perimeter states (see
Figure 1.1).
The passage of these cottage food laws has led to the revival of the age-old cottage food
industry. A survey of 775 cottage food producers in 22 states found that cottage food laws have
been important for rural economic development by providing entrepreneurial opportunities,
particularly for women with below-average income (McDonald, 2017). This study also found
that industrial-scale food regulations can hinder the viability of cottage foods, but well-designed
cottage food laws provide the flexibility and support needed to help these businesses thrive.
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Figure 1.1. The Spread of Cottage Food Laws in The United States1
Cottage food law adoption in the U.S. over time
Data provided by LawAtlas.org
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Levels of Selection. The adoption of cottage food laws is typically favored by cottage food
producers and consumers who stand to gain an economic advantage from their passage. These
laws may increase small scale food production and support the growth of this industry,
particularly in rural areas. Thus, perhaps there is a positive selection for political support for
cottage food laws among producers and consumers. Social learning has been an important
mechanism for the spread of this policy at the individual level; the excitement around the
movement has inspired entrepreneurs and patrons of local food to spread the word (Morris,
2011). Spatial diffusion may also play a role in the spread of these laws, as states in closer

1

Not shown: Alaska and Hawaii adopted cottage food laws in 2012 and 2017, respectively
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proximity appear to have adopted them around the same time period (see Figure 1). This
provides evidence of social transmission between states. Producers have also engaged with these
laws by bringing lawsuits to court in states with more restrictive laws or no cottage food
provision at all. These challenges have been successful in establishing and improving existing
cottage food laws in states like Minnesota and Wisconsin. At the next level, selection is
supported by groups of businesses and associations, including the New Jersey Home Bakers
Association, which have also brought legal challenges to the state laws regarding cottage food
production (Rice et al., 2018).
At the level of the state legislature, the popularity and widespread success of cottage food
laws suggest that selection favors adoption. The U.S. federal system, granting the power to
govern intrastate commerce to the states, has played a key role in allowing the spread of such
laws. The case of cottage food laws is an excellent example of states serving as laboratories of
democracy, a key motivation of federalist and multilevel governance structures (New State Ice
Co. v. Leibmann, 1932). The successful legal cases brought forth by businesses and associations
in order to institute, alter and improve cottage food laws show that the courts also favor cottage
food laws, and serve as an important mechanism for businesses owners to self-advocate and
influence public policy. The courts also allow the process of policy adoption to be iterative, as
laws continue to evolve by being re-shaped and improved by governing bodies to better suit the
changing needs of small businesses and the local food economy more broadly (Rice et al., 2018).
Summary. The widespread and rapid adoption of cottage food laws across the U.S. in recent
years is an example of how policies can spread across jurisdictions given the right conditions. A
number of social and economic factors including growing demand for local food, harsh
economic conditions as a result of the Great Recession, and the constitutional right of states to
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self-govern appear to have created positive selection pressure favoring policy adoption at
multiple levels.
Focal Trait: Maine’s Food Sovereignty Ordinance
Maine’s municipal food sovereignty ordinance, titled the “Local Food and Community
Self-Governance Ordinance” (LFCSGO) declares the right of a townspeople to “produce,
process, sell, purchase, and consume local foods” by exempting small producers from state
licensure, inspection, liability, and all other state food regulations pertaining to direct producerto-consumer transactions (Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance (Template),
2017). While the LFCSGO (commonly referred to as the food sovereignty ordinance, or FSO)
does not apply to meat or poultry production, which is regulated by the state’s inspection
program, it exempts the production and direct sale of dairy, eggs, produce and other perishable
items from state food regulations. The rapid spread of the FSO across Maine towns from 20112018 represents an amplification of the cottage food movement, seeking to protect small-scale
producers from burdensome regulations. The ordinance’s provisions make it more
comprehensive and aggressive than cottage food laws, suggesting that cottage food laws alone
might not go far enough in areas where local food systems and more traditional foodways are
thriving.
Policy Environment. Demand for locally-produced foods has been on the rise in the U.S. since
the late 2000s (Day-Farnsworth et al., 2009). This growth in demand has been observed in
Maine, with 80 percent of Maine consumers preferring food grown, raised or caught in Maine in
2013 (Maine Food Strategy, 2014). Changing demands have led to an increase in the value of
Maine’s crop and livestock operations by 24% from 2007-2012 and the number of farms by
13.6% during this period (Valigra, 2014). Young people are also seeking farming careers in
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Maine, with a 185 percent increase in the number of Maine farmers age 25-34 from 2002-2007
(Harlow, 2013) contrasting with the national trend of rapidly aging farmers (USDA, 2017).
Growth in Maine’s local food sector has led to increased interest in the legal
ramifications of small-scale food production, particularly the sale of raw meats, dairy and eggs.
The cost of compliance with state regulations presents a significant burden to small producers in
the state, who have attempted but failed to institute scale-appropriate state regulations (Kurtz,
2015). Failure to induce legal changes at the state level sparked the inception and spread of the
LFCSGO throughout the state, beginning in 2011 and continuing into 2018.
History. Maine’s food sovereignty ordinance was first penned and adopted in 2011 by five
coastal Maine towns: Blue Hill, Penobscot, Sedgwick, Trenton, and Hope. A key driving factor
in the spread of the FSO has been Local Food Rules (LFR), a group of activists led by farmer
Heather Retberg of Quill’s End Farm in Penobscot. Since its formation in 2011, LFR has been
working to help Maine towns pass the ordinance. Data collected from LocalFoodRules.org
(2018) show that a total of 45 municipalities representing thirteen of Maine’s counties have
adopted the ordinance (see Figure 1.2). The spread of the municipal ordinance across Maine
appears to be at least partly influenced by geographical proximity, beginning in the Midcoast
region and spreading through the interior of the state, suggesting that the adoption of the FSO
may also be transmitted via social learning from friends and neighbors.
Until recently, the ordinance itself did not provide any legal protection at the state level
for farmers. The first test of the ordinance’s legal validity failed in 2013 when Blue Hill farmer
Dan Brown was issued an injunction for the unlicensed sale of raw milk (Kurtz, 2015). This act
outraged supporters of the food sovereignty movement, which built awareness and encouraged
the spread of the ordinance across the state. In 2017, the Maine legislature passed and signed into
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law An Act to Recognize Local Control Regarding Food Systems (also referred to as the Maine
Food Sovereignty Act, or LD 725), which recognizes the right of a Maine municipality to adopt
and enforce its own FSO, and exempts “food products that are grown, produced or processed by
individuals within that municipality who sell directly to consumers” from state law (Maine Food
Sovereignty Act, 2017).
Figure 1.2. Adoption of a Local Food Sovereignty Ordinance in Maine
Data provided by LocalFoodRules.org

Food sovereignty ordinance adoption 2011-2018

Food sovereignty ordinance adoption 2011−2018
Maine municipalities

Maine municipalities

5200000

N
Miles
0

20

40

80

5100000

Adoption Date
lat

2018
2016

5000000

2014
2012

4900000

4800000

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Municipality

Westmanland
Wade
Starks
Rockland
Phillips
Parkman
Orland
Northport
Newburgh
Mount Vernon
Moose River
Montville
Lebanon
Jonesport
Georgetown
Fairfield
Chesterville
Chapman
Bucksport
Buckfield
Athens
Anson
Machias
Greenwood
Eliot
Canton
Auburn
Madison
Liberty
Solon
Moscow
Freedom
Bingham
Alexander
Brooklin
Isle au Haut
Brooksville
Plymouth
Livermore
Appleton
Trenton
Sedgwick
Penobscot
Hope
Blue Hill
2018

Adoption year
4e+05

5e+05

6e+05

long

Levels of Selection. At the individual level, the adoption of the FSO is supported by local food
consumers and producers who wish to deregulate the industry. High input costs and low profit
margins have motivated small-scale farms to support the ordinance, which frees them from
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costly state regulations. Those who do not support the ordinance include citizens concerned with
food safety aspects as well as producers who follow current rules and would like others to do the
same. Large dairy producers including The Maine Cheese Guild has opposed various food
sovereignty measures due to their high standards and emphasis on quality (Dowling, 2013).
Local food patrons and activists are motivated to support the ordinance because it aims to build a
stronger local food system throughout the state by lowering the costs of food production. At the
municipal level, adoption of the ordinance is supported by social learning and cultural group
transmission between towns, due in large part to campaign efforts by the grassroots organization
Local Food Rules. This is evident in the spatial diffusion of the ordinance, where towns in close
proximity appeared to adopt the ordinance around the same time (see Figure 1.2). County-level
courts have not supported the ordinance in previous legal decisions. The FSO failed to prevent
the Hancock County Superior Court from issuing an injunction against Mr. Dan Brown for
distributing raw milk without a license in Blue Hill, which had adopted the ordinance in 2011
(Kurtz, 2015).
The confines of the state legal system appear to have selected against the ordinance at the
level of the Maine state judiciary. As a result, the ordinance was deemed unconstitutional by the
Maine Supreme Court in 2014 (State of Maine v. Dan Brown, 2014). The municipal ordinance
failed to protect Mr. Brown from an injunction first issued by the county court, and later affirmed
by the state court. However, support for the ordinance at the state level changed directions when
the legislature passed the Maine Food Sovereignty Act with bipartisan support, which was signed
into law by Governor Paul LePage in 2017. This act recognizes the right of towns to enforce
food sovereignty ordinances under Maine’s home rule authority ("The Maine Food Sovereignty
Act", 2017). Maine legislators supported this bill due to widespread enthusiasm among
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constituents for the municipal ordinance, which diffused from the municipal level to the state
level via cultural group transmission. The passage of the 2017 act created a powerful institutional
change, evident in the 22 municipal ordinance adoptions which followed in 2018, representing
nearly half of all adoptions since inception of the ordinance in 2011 (see Figure 2). This is an
excellent example of multi-directional policy spread, from municipal to state level, and from
state to municipal level. As a result, adoption of the ordinance created a positive feedback: towns
adopted the ordinance, and the state formally recognized it, in turn encouraging more towns to
adopt the ordinance.
Summary. Maine’s municipal food sovereignty ordinance is a strong example of local
adaptation in the face of institutional challenges. What began as a small, grassroots movement of
small farmers and local food patrons grew and became strong enough to spread across
municipalities, ultimately reversing the direction of state policy on the issue. The diffusion of
this policy across municipalities and multiple levels of governance created a positive feedback
mechanism, in which support for ordinance adoption at the municipal level is amplified by
support at the state level.
Discussion & Conclusions
These two case studies have demonstrated the spread of local food policy over time and
space across multiple levels of governance, using an evolutionary framework to illustrate the
mechanisms involved in the policy diffusion process. The cases of cottage food and food
sovereignty tell the story of the emergence and spread of local food autonomy laws in the U.S.
The spread of cottage food laws gained momentum in the 1990s, around the time of the inception
of the food sovereignty movement. While these laws vary, they generally exempt small, in-home
food production of shelf-stable items (e.g. jams, baked goods, candies, etc.) from state food
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safety regulations and licensure. The right of states to control intrastate commerce, growing
demand for local food, and harsh economic conditions have played a role in determining the
selection pressure in favor of the adoption of cottage food laws at the individual, group, and state
levels. As a result of this pressure to adopt across multiple levels, the spread of cottage food laws
in the U.S. has become a strong example of how policies can spread and diffuse rapidly given the
right conditions.
Building on the food sovereignty movement, the state of Maine recently experienced the
widespread adoption and diffusion of a municipal food sovereignty ordinance, which exempts
the direct farm-to-consumer sale of eggs, dairy, produce and other perishables from compliance
with state regulations and licensure. Individual-level pressure in favor of the FSO has helped it
spread, as patrons and farmers alike benefit from the deregulation of local foods, which lowers
the costs of production. Social learning and group transmission between towns was also
important in the FSO’s spread. While legal constraints and precedent challenged the FSO at the
state level, where it was struck down in 2014 (State of Maine v. Dan Brown) by the Maine
Supreme Court, the diffusion of the FSO eventually led to the state’s adoption of the Maine Food
Sovereignty Act (LD 725), recognizing the right of towns to adopt ordinances and reversing the
direction of state-level pressure. The diffusion of the FSO to the state level created a positive
feedback in which town-level selection was amplified after the passage of LD 725.
One limitation of this analysis is that, without data on industry outcomes (e.g. profits,
survival rates, and other success measures), it is not possible to determine whether or not these
policies are actually being selected for, and hence whether or not they are truly adaptive.
Alternatively, evidence suggests that these case studies may be examples of non-adaptive drift,
with traits being copied and transmitted randomly. Some evidence has emerged to suggest that
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cottage food laws have allowed the industry to thrive and grow (McDonald, 2017; Sibilla, 2019),
but the case of Maine’s food sovereignty ordinance has yet to be analyzed ex-post. Only time
and data will tell if these policies result in the strengthening of local food organizations and
institutions or not.
The implementation of an evolutionary framework in policy analysis can help us
understand not only how policies spread, but also the conditions which help or hinder the
diffusion of policies across multiple levels of governance. Tools from evolutionary social science
allow us to identify the dominant levels and direction of selection, so that policymakers can
potentially alter selection pressures to change outcomes. For example, identifying where high
costs of adoption are likely to impede the spread of certain policies is helpful in developing
incentives. Maine is currently experiencing the spread of municipal plastic bans, which prohibit
the use of single-use plastic in restaurants and retail outlets (Abbate, 2018). One thing activists
and policymakers might consider in this case is the direction of selection at different levels,
which might draw attention to the extra costs to businesses this policy poses, and how those costs
might be mitigated. Paying attention to transmission also becomes important when working for
political change, as the Local Food Rules organization did when it pushed for the adoption of the
municipal food sovereignty ordinance in Maine. Further, an evolutionary analysis is particularly
useful in making predictions about how policies might spread in the future. For example, now
that Maine has become the first state to adopt food sovereignty legislation, we might expect to
see states like Vermont, New York, and other early adopters of cottage food laws experience the
spread of food sovereignty legislation.
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CHAPTER 2
CAPTURING COOPERATION IN FOOD BUYING CLUBS:
AN EVOLUTIONARY CASE STUDY
Cooperation & the Evolution of Organizations
Despite the perpetual incentive for individuals to free-ride, the human ability to leverage
cooperation in groups has allowed our species to dominate the Earth’s ecosystem (Henrich,
2015). Cooperation, defined in game-theoretic terms, is an act that benefits others. It is
distinguished from altruism, defined as an act of cooperation resulting in a net loss for the actor.
Cooperation itself is not favored by natural selection unless specific mechanisms are at work
(Rand & Nowak, 2013). This is because social dilemmas, scenarios in which the interests of the
individual are in conflict with those of the group, present an incentive for individual group
members to free-ride by reaping the benefits of the group without contributing (Axelrod &
Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006). Cooperation is necessary in order to solve social dilemmas,
which are present in many contexts but often play a central role in sustainability challenges, as
noted by Hardin’s (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons. The challenge of managing freeridership is demonstrated mathematically by the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a hypothetical scenario in
which two players’ self-interested behavior fails to provide the highest total payoff (Camerer,
2003). In the game, both players’ defection is considered the Nash equilibrium, a strategy in
which no other player has anything to gain by changing their own play. This creates a perpetual
grid-lock in which the two players continually defect. If an entire population adopts this strategy,
it cannot be invaded by a mutant a cooperator, and defection becomes the evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS). While a cooperator cannot invade a group of defectors, a single defector may
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invade a group of cooperators. This conundrum illustrates how strongly defection is favored over
cooperation by the process of natural selection.
The process of group selection, whereby natural selection acts at the level of the group,
has allowed humans to become conditional cooperators, requiring specific mechanisms to
stabilize and support cooperation. Those mechanisms include direct and indirect reciprocity,
spatial selection, multilevel selection, and kin selection (Rand & Nowak, 2013). Social
mechanisms, including reciprocity, reputation and social norms have been shown to be more
powerful at promoting cooperation than material rewards (Kraft-Todd, Yoeli, Bhanot, & Rand,
2015). Other factors which can help stabilize cooperation include a small group size, repeated
interactions, and punishment mechanisms (Stewart & Plotkin, 2016; D.S. Wilson, Elinor Ostrom,
& Michael E. Cox, 2013).
In order for cooperation to be stabilized enough to actually resolve social dilemmas, the
pressure to cooperate must be stronger than the pressure to free-ride. In essence, group-level
selection must dominate individual-level selection. This happens when intergroup competition
(e.g. war and raiding, differential group survival, migration, reproduction, and prestige-based
group transmission) drives cooperation (Stewart & Plotkin, 2016; D.S. Wilson, Elinor Ostrom, &
Michael E. Cox, 2013). These various mechanisms of intergroup competition drive the evolution
of institutions, rules and norms which support cooperation. Ostrom’s (1990) institutional
solutions to support cooperation and manage common-pool resources are well studied, and have
been identified as useful for groups in contexts outside of natural resource management (Wilson
& Gowdy, 2013). Intergroup competition also drives the evolution of organizations, defined as
specific types of institutions with clearly-defined boundaries, principles of sovereignty, and a
hierarchy of responsibility (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010). Competition motivates organizations to
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seek out the best solutions to improve performance, and their subsequent successes and failures
result in learning, which then triggers learning in rival organizations (Barnett & Hansen, 1996).
This selection process creates conditions in which more cooperative organizations outperform
and outlive less cooperative ones, ultimately driving the evolution of organizations.
Cooperation in Cooperatives
This research is concerned with the evolution of a special type of organization: the
consumer food cooperative. Cooperatively-structured firms are distinguished from traditional,
hierarchical firms in that they are typically member-owned and controlled democratically (ICA,
2015), and may even rely on cooperation to survive (Fulton, 1990). Experimental evidence has
shown that customers of cooperatives exhibit a higher base level of cooperation than shoppers at
a traditional grocery (Tremblay, Hupper, & Waring, 2019). The cooperative structure has been
criticized for being less efficient and less profitable than hierarchical firms. However, such
arguments often ignore the niche role of cooperatives in counteracting market failure (Nilsson,
2001). For example, cooperatives have demonstrated resilience and even growth during times of
economic downturn (Birchall & Ketilson, 2009; Craig & Pencavel, 1992). This resilience is
likely the result of the cooperative structure, emphasizing collective decision-making and
inclusive solutions to support members and their communities. However, the cooperative
structure does pose a social dilemma that requires members to cooperate (Fulton, 1990).
Cooperatives’ reliance on cooperation motivates an investigation into the mechanisms by which
these organizations have evolved to maintain cooperation and thrive in niche markets.
Due to the underlying social dilemma, cooperatives must manage the problem of freeridership to be successful (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2016). Cooperatives often use a set of guidelines
which originated in England in the 1840s and have spread to become common among different
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types of cooperatives (ICA, 2015). There are a total of seven principles for successful cooperative management, including (1) Voluntary and open membership, (2) Democratic member
control, (3) Member economic participation, (4) Autonomy and independence, (5) Education,
training and information, (6) Cooperation among cooperatives, and (7) Concern for community
(ICA, 2015). Some work has noted similarities between the co-op principles and Ostrom’s
institutional design principles (Lund, 2011), which have been identified as highly applicable to
cooperatives (Gupta, 2014). Not unlike the design principles, the historical record suggests that
the co-op principles are a set of institutional adaptations which emerged as a result of selection
on organizational structure, as well as descent with modification which helped co-ops thrive and
spread (Waring & Lange, 2019). The current study of small-scale, informal cooperative
purchasing groups will aid in the understanding of how these adaptations emerged and what role
they play in stabilizing cooperation within an organizational context.
Consumer Food Cooperatives
Cooperative businesses take many forms; they can be worker-owned, producer-owned, or
consumer-owned, and vary greatly by mission and industry. This research focuses on small
consumer food cooperatives, which are owned and operated by consumers and operate in retail
settings. Food buying clubs are informal food cooperatives which arise when individuals
convene to use their collective purchasing power to obtain bulk quantities of food at per-unit
prices lower than offered by traditional grocers, or specialty items which cannot be found
elsewhere. Food buying clubs order directly from wholesalers and local producers, removing the
middleman and allowing members more control over their desired goods and means of provision
(Herrmann, 1993). Many food buying clubs seek to purchase primarily organic, local, non-GMO,
sustainable, fair trade, and rare or ethnic food items, in addition to a number of natural and
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organic household and personal care products offered by some larger distributors like United
Natural Foods, Inc. (UNFI) and Frontier Co-op. Many buying clubs use online catalogs to collate
orders, a more efficient method than using paper order books or manually entering orders into
spreadsheets. While much of these clubs’ activity occurs online, members typically meet in
person to break down and distribute orders biweekly or monthly, and some clubs have annual or
semi-annual meetings.
Buying clubs vary in size and formality – some are very large with complex sets of rules
and requirements, while others are relatively small and informal. Successful buying clubs which
are able to overcome the problem of free-ridership may eventually grow and transition to formal
cooperative stores or “food co-ops,” physical storefronts which market and sell products to
consumers directly. While co-ops are certainly more formal than buying clubs, they retain grouplevel attributes similar to their informal predecessors, including formal membership, collective
governance, and work-sharing (ICA, 2015).
Buying Clubs & Cooperation
The structure of buying clubs likely requires members to cooperate with one another,
both organizationally and economically (Tremblay & Waring, 2015). Unlike traditional food
buying venues, buying clubs require a significant amount of work and energy from members to
be sustained. Most clubs are run by a single coordinator, who oversees the group and may solicit
help from members in breaking down orders, bookkeeping, hosting meetings, submitting orders
to vendors, greeting a delivery truck, managing surplus items, managing new members, and
other tasks. These tasks require members to donate time and labor for the benefit of the group, as
opposed to online retailers or traditional storefronts which offer greater convenience. The
amount of organizational cooperation required by clubs can sometimes be too costly for
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prospective members. In one phone interview I conducted with the coordinator of a club with
detailed work requirements, the coordinator said, “plenty of people inquire [about the club], and
are shown the FAQs (work tasks and job rotation), after which they often decide not to join.”
In addition to work tasks, the nature of buying clubs requires members to cooperate
economically by sharing purchases of bulk items. Shared purchases, or “splits,” happen when at
least two club members contribute to the purchase of a bulk item which is to be divided and
redistributed upon receipt. The challenge of coordinating and filling split orders is likely to
require cooperation among club members when preferences diverge and members must purchase
items they do not prefer in order to help others fill splits. In this case, members behave
altruistically to help the group, versus simply coordinating to fill a split which is mutually
agreeable when members’ preferences sufficiently overlap.
The organizational and economic cooperation required in buying clubs makes them
difficult to operate and maintain, particularly in a broader natural food market that continues to
offer greater levels of convenience and lower prices to consumers. While food buying clubs help
members gain access to specialty items, they exist in competition with many other vendors
including online retailers, farmers’ markets, natural food stores, and traditional grocery stores
and supermarkets. This competition creates a harsh environment in which clubs operate, and
makes them less resilient to external shocks than their formal competitors. As one club
coordinator put it, “You have to be organized and plan [to be in the club]. Life happens, but
being part of a food co-op2 is a conscious choice. Families need to eat but they don’t need to
belong to a food co-op.” Buying clubs’ likely reliance on cooperation implies that group

2

I refer to the informal buying clubs as “groups” or “clubs” to avoid confusion with formal cooperative stores,
however they are commonly referred to as “food co-ops” or “co-ops” by members.
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selection via harsh environmental conditions (e.g. competition with other vendors) and
exogenous shocks (e.g. loss of meeting space, coordinator leaving the group), will lead more
cooperative clubs to outperform and outlive those which are less cooperative.
Buying clubs may overcome these challenges by instituting adaptations which stabilize
cooperation. Because many clubs require individuals to cooperate by performing work tasks and
sharing purchases, they often struggle to manage free-ridership. One adaptation clubs may use to
support cooperation is reciprocity, or the expectation that kind acts will be rewarded (Trivers,
1971). Theoretical modeling suggests that buying clubs may rely on reciprocity. Tremblay
(2017) shows that generalized reciprocity supports cooperation in buying clubs using an agentbased model designed to simulate splitting behavior. This research builds upon Tremblay’s
original findings by further examining the role reciprocity plays in maintaining buying club
cooperation, function, and overall success.
Another adaptation that may be important for stabilizing cooperation in buying clubs is
the adoption of rules and requirements for club membership. Institutional design principles, like
rules in buying clubs, can stabilize cooperation and help groups sustainably manage public goods
(Ostrom, 1990). In buying clubs, such rules may help distribute responsibility evenly among
members, preventing individuals from free-riding on coordinator efforts. Consistent with Waring
and Lange’s (2019) finding that cooperatives have been able to overcome adaptive challenges by
adopting a set of management principles, it is likely that similar adaptations may also be
observed in buying clubs, the informal precursor of co-ops. If cooperation is as important for
cooperatives as suggested by theory, then it should be possible to measure it in food buying
clubs.
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Hypothesis & Predictions
Over their lives, clubs will face many challenges. Some of these challenges include
soliciting help from members, distributing work tasks fairly, reaching order minimums, filling
splits, managing ordering cycles, and other organizational challenges. I hypothesize that groups
which adapt to these challenges will outperform those who do not, as they will be more resilient
when facing harsh economic conditions and exogenous shocks. Key adaptations that may help
clubs succeed include maintaining strong reciprocity between members and adopting formal
rules to sustain cooperation.

Adaptive Hypothesis: Successful clubs have traits that allow
them
to sustain
Figure 2.1.
Adaptive
Process cooperation
of Food Buying Clubs.

CHALLENGE

Economic (shared purchasing)
Organizational (payment,
delivery, work tasks. etc.)

SELECTION

Differential success due to:
- Harsh conditions
- Exogenous shocks

ADAPTATION

Economic (reciprocity)
Organizational (rules)

I explore the impact of club reciprocity and rules on various measures of success.
Reciprocity sustains cooperation (Trivers, 1971)

Reciprocity and rules are expected
to help
reduce sustains
group reliance
individuals
à Generalized
reciprocity
cooperationoningenerous
clubs (Tremblay,
2017) by
Rules & institutions stabilize cooperation (Ostrom, 1990)

encouraging members to cooperate with one another. More reciprocal and more formal clubs are
expected to be more functional than less reciprocal, less formal clubs, because reciprocity and
institutions support cooperation. Finally, if reciprocity and rules are organizational adaptations,
they should be more prevalent in older clubs, given the evolutionary implication that less
reciprocal and less formal clubs would be selected out of the population.
Prediction 1. Due to the cooperative structure of buying clubs, members will be
cooperative toward their groups.
Prediction 2. Buying clubs will exercise reciprocity through order-sharing.
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Prediction 3. Reciprocity will help clubs succeed. Specifically,
A. Reciprocity will reduce the need for altruism & support (non-altruistic)
cooperation in clubs.
B. Reciprocity will promote club functionality.
C. Older clubs will be more reciprocal.
Prediction 4. The adoption of rules will help clubs succeed. Specifically,
A. Rules will reduce the need for altruism & support (non-altruistic) cooperation
in clubs.
B. Rules will promote club functionality.
C. Rules will help clubs survive.
Methods
This research3 observes a group of food buying clubs subscribed to two online ordering
services, BuyingClubSoftware, Inc. (BCS) and Foodclub.org (Foodclub). Access to buying club
data was made possible through partnerships between the research team and the owners of these
two services, Mr. Jeremy Bloom (of BCS) and Mr. Adi Fairbank (of Foodclub), who obtained
permission from groups before granting the research team access to club data. The team also
received multiple approvals from the University of Maine’s Institutional Review Board before
soliciting or viewing any human subject data via the clubs’ purchasing history, online surveys,
and phone interviews. A total of 48 buying clubs (2,951 total individuals) are represented in the
purchasing data from BCS and Foodclub combined. Of those 48, 14 clubs (177 total individuals)

3

This thesis is one component of a larger research program funded by National Science Foundation CAREER grant SES1352361 to Dr. Timothy Waring. This project calls upon the work of many former and current researchers, namely Mr. Ethan
Tremblay, Mr. Taylor Lange, Mr. Antonio Jurlina, and myself.
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are represented in survey data, with seven from BCS and seven from Foodclub. Interviews with
eight coordinators and one member represent seven clubs from Foodclub, and one from BCS.
Table 2.1. Buying Club Study Sample Sizes.
Software
BCS
BCS
Foodclub
Foodclub
All
All

Groups/people Purchase data
groups
people
groups
people
groups
people

29
2,524
19
427
48
2,951

Survey

Experiment

Interview

7
94
7
83
14
177

7
DG: 93; PGG: 90
7
83
14
173

0
1
7
8
8
9

Coordinator Interviews
A major component of this research is concerned with the organizational environment of
food buying clubs. This thesis follows up on previous work which analyzed data collected in a
survey of BuyingClubSoftware, Inc. groups (Hupper, 2017). In the original BCS survey, club
coordinators were prompted to answer a set of questions separate from the main survey,
regarding the history, structure, and organization of their club. Many of these questions were
designed to measure whether and to what extent groups implement similar versions of Ostrom’s
(1990) institutional design principles in their organization. After analyzing results from the first
survey, it was decided that in order to gain a richer understanding of how clubs operate, the
coordinators should be interviewed. A round of semi-structured phone interviews with Foodclub
coordinators replaced the coordinator section of the original online survey, effectively shortening
and simplifying it for respondents. Further, establishing trust and personal connections with
coordinators over the phone before undertaking a full examination of the clubs improved the
quality of data collected from Foodclub groups.
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Phone interviews with club coordinators were conducted in the summer of 2018.
Interviews were scheduled via email, and coordinators were informed that the interview would
be helpful to their club, confidential, and take about 30 minutes to complete. When coordinators
answered the phone, the interviewer read a statement of informed consent prior to beginning the
interview and asked if the subject was willing to participate. Consent was provided by answering
“yes” verbally. Interviews were not recorded on any devices, but notes were taken on the
computer by the interviewer while questions were being answered. The interview template used
contains 17 questions, including sections on club history, group function, order-sharing, member
contributions, integration of Ostrom’s design principles4, and the club’s biggest challenges and
successes over the years (see Appendix A). The interview concludes by asking permission for
the research team to access the club’s purchasing history, as well as permission to share the
online survey with the club. All coordinators interviewed agreed to both requests.
When compared to survey responses, the richness of interview dialogue allows for a
greater level of precision when classifying qualitative data into quantitative variables. After
reviewing interview notes, a new dataset was generated by compiling the number of active
members, club age in years, and number of rules adopted. This club-level dataset is a key
element of multilevel analysis, providing a source of variation among clubs.
Online Surveys
This research combines data from two online surveys, one conducted from 2016-2017
with BCS groups5 (located in the US), and the second survey was implemented in 2018 with

4

Principle eight (nested enterprises) was not included in the interview questions because I find it does not apply as
well to small, informal groups like buying clubs as the first seven design principles do.
5
See Hupper (2017) for full details of the original survey
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Foodclub groups (located in New England). Of the 16 active Foodclub groups whose contact
information was made available to the team, seven coordinators agreed to have their club
participate. Qualtrics Survey Software was used to build the survey and generate a unique URL
for each club, which coordinators shared via email with members. Members were informed that
the survey is built to help their club by providing key information for diagnostic and buying club
“health” reports, includes a paid economic game, will provide high-participation clubs with $100
off their Foodclub.org fees, is fully confidential, and takes roughly 15 minutes to complete.
The original BCS survey was revised and shortened to create a new, 32-question survey
for Foodclub groups. Many questions were shortened and restructured for clarity and brevity,
and others were removed for being less useful to the goals of the research than originally
anticipated. Reused questions include the dictator and public goods games, percent of household
needs met through the club, percent of the time members help others fill splits (assistance given),
percent of the time members are helped by others in splits (assistance received), Likert scale
questions regarding club communication, member contributions, member benefits, overall club
function, and club satisfaction, as well as suggestions for club improvement, and demographic
variables6. A handful of new questions were also added (see Appendix B), but these variables
have been excluded from the dataset in order to preserve the full sample of BCS and Foodclub
groups for analysis.
The Foodclub survey was launched in mid-July, 2018 and ran through the end of
September, 2018, collecting a total of 83 complete responses (see Table 2.1). After closing the
survey, respondents were compensated via the Cash App with payments based on the outcome of
6

All demographic questions from the original survey were preserved except household size and number of
household earners. This is because the number of household dependents is likely to be a more relevant indicator of a
member’s reliance on their buying club than household size or number of earners.
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the two economic games played. High-participating clubs were compensated with a $100 credit
to their Foodclub account. In order to prepare the BCS and Foodclub survey data for analysis,
.CSV files were exported from Qualtrics and cleaned using the software R. Packages used in this
process include ‘tidyr’ (Wickham, Henry, & RStudio, 2018), ‘dplyr’ (Wickham, Francois,
Henry, Müller, & RStudio, 2018), and ‘readr’ (Wickham, Hester, et al., 2018). After cleaning,
CSVs of each dataset were generated and merged manually. Club-level data for BCS groups was
gathered by reviewing coordinator survey responses to determine club age, size, and number of
rules. Although this method of extraction doesn’t match the accuracy and nuance of interview
data, it provides the second-best insight into how the clubs are structured. The final dataset used
for analysis includes 164 observations and 13 variables.
Experimental Economic Games
In keeping with the structure of the original BCS survey, the Foodclub survey begins by
presenting respondents with two experimental economic games. The first is a one-shot dictator
game, designed to measure individual-to-individual altruism or unenforced fairness (Camerer,
2003; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). In this version of the game, the respondent (the
dictator) is presented with an initial endowment of $8 and given the option to donate any wholedollar amount of that endowment ($0-$8) to the next player (the recipient) who is identified as an
anonymous member of the respondent’s buying club (see Figure 2.1). The dictator also serves as
the anonymous recipient in round two (i.e. when another respondent acts as the dictator). The
respondent’s total compensation is therefore equal to the amount of the initial endowment kept
while acting as the dictator, plus the amount received when acting as the recipient for another
dictator.
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Figure 2.2. Dictator Game Setup.
Donation

Initial
endowment

$4
Dictator

$8

Recipient

Keeps $4
Total Payoffs:

$4

$4

After completing the dictator game, respondents are presented with a one-shot public
goods game, which is designed to measure individual-to-group cooperation (Camerer, 2003;
Davis & Holt, 1993). This version of the game has a setup similar to the dictator game, except
that respondents are given the option to donate any whole-dollar amount of their $8 endowment
($0-$8) to a collective fund for their buying club instead of a single anonymous individual. The
group fund then sums all donations, multiplies them by 1.4, and distributes them evenly among
players (see Figure 2.3). The respondents are then compensated with the remaining amount of
the endowment they chose to keep, plus the payoff from the pooled group fund.
Figure 2.3. Public Goods Game Setup.
Initial
endowment

Donation

$8

Player 1

$8

Player 2

$8 (kept $0)

Total payoff

Payoff

Pooled club
contributions

$7

Player 1

$9

Player 2

$7

Player 3

$14

$15 x 1.4 = $21

$8

Player 3
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Summary of Interview, Survey & Experimental Data
A total of eight coordinators and one founding member agreed to participate in phone
interviews, representing a total of seven Foodclub groups (see Table 2.1 for a full summary of
data collection) and one BCS group that had disbanded. For Foodclub groups, all except for
clubs F1, F5 and F6 achieved 100 survey percent participation among members7.
Figure 2.4. Survey Response Rates8.
Total active members using BCS & Foodclub

BCS & Foodclub survey response rates
40

82%
Legend

30

100%

Responding members

40%

Total active members

75% 40%

20

100%
100%

100% 64%
10

100%

100% 86%

80%

100%

0
B1

B2

B3

B4

B5

B6

B7

F1

F2

F3

F4

F5

F6

F7

Club ID

Interview & Survey Data Analysis
Interview and survey results include both qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative
data are analyzed by searching for patterns in the responses relevant to research predictions.
Interviews and surveys were coded on categories such as club age, size, number of rules, etc. A
club-level dataset of quantitative data from surveys and interviews was constructed for formal

7

It is possible that more than one member of some households took the survey. Some manage two separate accounts
but typically order from one main account. This might impact the “true” response rate from clubs. However, this
cannot be determined from the data, and usernames which are present in the survey but not in the purchase data are
dropped from the analysis.
8
Club names are not revealed in order to protect the identities of research participants. Club IDs were assigned to
each group, and chosen based on whether the group is subscribed to Foodclub (F) or BCS (B). Numerical rankings
were chosen based on observed group size, with larger clubs ranked lower and smaller clubs ranked higher.
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analysis, with variables including club age, size, number of rules, average game contributions,
and averages of individual survey measures including satisfaction with club, overall club
function, even distribution of work tasks (member contributions), help given to others to
complete splits, and help received from others to complete splits.
Results
Overview of Qualitative Results
Phone interviews with club coordinators and qualitative survey responses reveal rich
information about some of the key challenges buying clubs face as they grow and age. Results
support the prediction that buying clubs require two major types of cooperation to function:
economic cooperation (order-sharing) and organizational cooperation (work-sharing). Sharing
bulk purchases is an important function of many clubs. As one coordinator said, “Foodclub’s big
feature is the splits – it is essential to what we do.” Many coordinators praised Foodclub and
BCS for providing an easy platform to coordinate and organize orders, particularly with split
items which “were very time consuming” before the software was available. However, club size
can limit the amount of splitting clubs can do, which is a problem faced by nearly all groups in
our study. When asked about a “sweet spot” in terms of club size, many coordinators gave a
number between 20 and 25 people, a range substantially larger than the average club size in our
study, which is about 15. Clubs often struggle to recruit enough regularly ordering members to
reach order minimums and gain access to a variety of items. As one coordinator stated, “more
people on splits creates a greater variety of products, due to more varied preferences.” Another
coordinator mentioned that “50 percent of splits end up failing” because the club is too small to
fill bulk orders. Some coordinators mentioned having to purchase surplus items to help the group
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reach order minimums and achieve splits, and one club in particular had to merge with another
club to gain enough members to be able to place an order every month.
Equally as important as splits, if not more, is group membership. As one coordinator
explained, “splits are not the most important feature (not all vendors require splits), the
community is – lots of people have made friends and are like-minded.” Having a sufficient
number of motivated members also help clubs accomplish necessary work tasks, because “a
smaller pool of members creates more work for everyone.” Clubs are fundamentally challenged
with optimizing membership based on split and order needs, work tasks, and overall efficiency.
Finding and recruiting members can be tough, as some groups have experienced “a lack of
members wanting to take the time to participate.” Depending on the club, the necessary
contributions (i.e. sharing work tasks) can discourage potential new members. When asked about
problems faced by their clubs, many survey respondents mentioned something along the lines of
“not enough people to fill splits,” “getting all members engaged and committed” and needing
“more members to share the work.”
One way clubs are able to recruit help from members and distribute work tasks more
fairly is by establishing rules and norms to support cooperation. The number of rules adopted by
the clubs in our study ranges from one to six (see Table 2.2). Some rules are formal and
enforced, while others are informal social norms. The most common rules include requiring
members to 1) complete their designated work task, 2) attend meetings, 3) pay an annual
membership fee, 4) pay a service fee on orders to cover operating costs, 5) bring money to
breakdown meetings, 6) pick up their order on time, 7) be willing to help with breakdown, and 8)
help the coordinator break down large bulk orders. Common designated work tasks include
bookkeeping, collating orders, organizing breakdown meetings, managing invoices, picking up
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foods from local vendors, meeting the delivery truck, and weighing, counting and measuring
split items at breakdown meetings. Most clubs allow members to sign up for jobs voluntarily,
and some have a rotating job schedule.
Table 2.2. Summary of Club-Level Data
Club ID Club age in Number of active
years
members9
B1
13
27
B2
10
25
B3
4
20
B4
6
20
B5
8
11
B6
7
11
B7
7
8
F1
29
38
F2
30
17
F3
36
12
F4
7
8
F5
3
7
F6
2
5
F7
3
3
Average
11.8
15.1
Median
7
11.5

Number of
rules adopted
1
3
4
4
3
4
6
4
6
5
3
2
1
1
3.4
3.5

Experimental Games Results
The following results were obtained from two experimental economic games played in
online surveys with food buying club members in 2016 and 2018. The dictator game measures
individual-to-individual altruism or unenforced fairness, and the public goods game measures
individual-to-group cooperation (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3 for game structures). Figures 2.5 and
2.6 provide a distribution of donations for each game.

9

Active members are defined as those who use BuyingClubSoftware or Foodclub.org regularly. This number may
underestimate the true size of the club, as some members choose to purchase from other ordering platforms, but
those individuals cannot be observed in the data.
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FigureDictator
2.5. Dictator
Game Donations.
game donations

FigurePublic
2.6. Public
Goods
Game Donations.
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0
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0

0

2

4

6

0

8

2

4

6

8

Donation in $

Donation in $

The average percent of endowment donated in the dictator game was $4.67, and the average
percent of endowment donated in the public goods game was $5.61 (see Table 2.3). The dictator
game typically produces a tri-modal distribution with donations primarily centered on the
minimum, median and max, in descending order (Engel, 2011). Here I observe very few
donations at the minimum ($0), with the most common choice at the median ($4) and the next
most common choice at the max ($8). The public goods game also typically follows a tri-modal
distribution similar to that of the dictator game, but these results follow the reverse pattern with
few donations at the min ($0) and most at the max ($8).
Table 2.3. Experimental Game Summary Statistics.
Dictator game Public goods game
Mean donation
$4.67
$5.61
Mean % of endowment donated
58%
71%
Standard deviation
1.83
2.49
Sample size
176
173
One way to analyze the dictator and public goods game results is to compare them to
those of other studies. Such games are widely used in academic literature, although study design
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can differ slightly. To gain a sense of where these results fall in comparison to other populations,
I conduct a meta-analysis of studies that implement similar versions of the dictator and public
goods games with various groups and individuals. The types of groups studied across this
literature ranges from small-scale societies and indigenous groups to college students belonging
to Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies (Norenzayan,
Henrich, & Heine, 2010).
I compare our results to a total of eight similar studies. Six of those studies provide
enough information to perform a test of differences in proportions, while two are meta-analyses
and only provide a study-wide mean. Lamba & Mace (2011), Leider et al. (2009), and Paciotti et
al. (2011) each reported the standard deviation, mean and sample size directly. Data generated by
Eckel & Grossman (1998) had to be recreated and analyzed manually using a summary of data.
Apicella et al. (2012) only provided the sample size and standard error, which was used to
calculate the standard deviation manually. Henrich et al. (2001) only reported a mean and sample
size, but was still included for calculating the percent change in means. Engel (2011) and
Zelmer (2003) are meta-analyses and only provide the mean percent of endowment donated.
Many other studies were examined but ultimately excluded from analysis because they involve
iterated games, which invoke different interpretations than one-shot games, as played in the
current study (Henrich et al., 2010). Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide a full summary of comparison
results.
Table 2.4. Dictator Game Meta-Analysis (One-Shot Games).
Study

Subject

Sample
size

This study

food buying
clubs

176

Mean % of
endowment
contributed
58%

39

% change
(this study)

t-value

p-value

Table 2.4 continued.

Paciotti et al.,
2011
Leider et al.,
2009
Engel, 2011*

Community
groups
WEIRD
students
(friends)
Mixed

WEIRD
students
(women)
Eckel &
WEIRD
Grossman, 1998 students (men)
Eckel &
Grossman, 1998

183

48%

+21%

3.49

< 0.001

181

38%

+53%

10.78

< 0.001

129
studies

28%

+107%

60

16%

+263%

23.44

< 0.001

60

8%

+625%

28.01

< 0.001

The mean percent of endowment contributed in the dictator game in this study is larger than all
other means analyzed, and statistically significantly greater than results from all other studies
analyzed with a t-test. The mean dictator game donation closest to that of the current study is 48
percent (community groups), while the mean donation farthest from that of the current study is 8
percent (male students).
Table 2.5. Public Goods Game Meta-Analysis (One-Shot Games).
Study

Subject

This study

food buying
clubs

173

71%

24

58%

+22%

205

57%

+25%

6.60

< 0.001

301

52%

+37%

12.02

< 0.001

27
studies

38%

+87%

Henrich et al.,
Orma (Kenya)
2001
Apicella et al.,
Hadza (x310)
2012
(Tanzania)
Lamba & Mace, Pahari Korwa
2011
(India)
WEIRD
Zelmer, 2003*
students

10

Mean % of
endowment
contributed

Sample
size

The Hadza bands played public goods games with a multiplier of 300%
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% change
t-value
(this study)

p-value

The mean percent of endowment contributed in the public goods game in the current study is
larger than all other means analyzed, and statistically significantly greater than results from all
other similar studies analyzed with a t-test. The mean public goods game donation closest to that
of the current study is 58 percent donated by the Orma people, while the farthest mean is thirtyeight percent donated by students. Overall, these results provide support for prediction 1 by
showing increased cooperation among buying club members compared to other populations.
Scientific Questions & Data Structure
This research is primarily concerned with answering the question of how buying clubs
might adapt to the challenges they face. To address my predictions, I will examine how grouplevel structures influence both individual and group-level outcomes. For this purpose, the data
collected follow a hierarchical structure, containing individual (member) and group (club)
characteristics. A common statistical approach used to analyze this type of data is a hierarchical
linear model (HLM), which estimates random slopes and/or intercepts for each grouping class
assigned. HLMs are designed to resolve non-independence within nested classes of data, and has
the ability to control for between-group variation which may impact individual-level data. The
following analyses will take a broad-to-narrow approach, first by summarizing the amount of
variation explained by each group, then by estimating a series of random effect models to explain
the effects of individual and group-level explanatory variables on dependent variables of interest.
Summary of Data by Club
The following scatterplots illustrate how data from a handful of survey questions vary
across groups. Points have been jittered to show the density of observations at the value, and the
black diamonds represent means for each club. The following plots summarize four individuallevel dependent variables including dictator game donation (in $), public goods game donation
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(in $), reciprocity in shared purchases, and overall club function (measure of perceived club
function). Reciprocity is calculated by subtracting the percent of the time members report giving
assistance in splits from the percent of the time they report receiving assistance to others (net
received or NR). This calculation centers perfectly balanced reciprocity (giving the same amount
as receiving) at zero, with negative scores indicating altruistic behavior (giving more than
receiving) and positive scores indicating free-riding behavior (giving less than receiving).
Figure 2.7. DG Donations by Club.
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Figure 2.8. PGG Donations by Club.
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Figure 2.9. Net Received by Club.
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Figure 2.10. Overall Function by Club.
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Hierarchical Linear Model Specification
HLMs not only control for individual and between-group differences, but also provide a
measure of variation in the data explained across levels. While I control for individual-level
differences using data collected in the survey (demographics, etc.), I am primarily interested in
how differences are explained between groups, and what the group-level characteristics are that
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drive those differences. I apply the random-intercept model, which allows group intercepts to
vary but assumes fixed slopes across groups. While the random slope and intercept model is
likely the most realistic, the random intercept model is simpler and best suited to examine the
proportion of total variation explained by groups. I also employ an ANOVA for random-effects,
which conducts a likelihood ratio test (LRT) on two models (with and without the random effect)
to determine which of the two models best fits the data according to their log-likelihoods. The
HLMs used in this thesis are of the form,
𝑌"# = 𝛽&# + 𝛽(# 𝑋"# + 𝑒"#

Eq.1

𝛽&# = 𝛾&& + 𝛾&( 𝑊# + 𝑢&#

Eq. 2

where 𝑌"# is a dependent variable, 𝛽&# is the level 2 intercept, 𝛽(# is the slope of relationship (in
level 2) between level 1 predictor and dependent variable, 𝑋"# is the level 1 predictor variable,
and 𝑒"# is the random error (level 1), 𝛾&& is the overall intercept (grand mean across groups), 𝛾&(
is the overall regression coefficient, 𝑊# is the level 2 predictor (number of rules, reciprocity
slope, etc.), and 𝑢&# random error (deviation of group from overall intercept).
Individual control variables were chosen from game theory literature, which provides the
expected sign for the effect of demographic variables on game donations. For the dictator game,
females tend to donate more than males (Pan & Houser, 2011), wealthier individuals tend to
donate less than less wealthy individuals (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010), and older
participants typically donate more than younger ones (Engel, 2011). In the public goods game,
women tend to donate more than men (Nowell & Tinkler, 1994), older individuals tend to donate
less than younger individuals (Rieger & Mata, 2015), and wealth has no significant effect on
donations (Buckley & Croson, 2006). In order for models to converge, individual control
variables were scaled so predictor means were centered to zero.
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Percent of household needs met through the club, which captures the extent to which
individuals rely on their club to meet their needs, was used as a control variable for all models.
Individual reliance on and involvement in clubs may influence the way people feel and behave
toward their group. For example, if one person meets 80 percent of their total household needs
through the club, they may have an increased propensity to join in on split orders, compared to
another person who only fills 20 percent of their needs. This key difference may also translate to
experimental game outcomes, as the games were chosen for their ability to mimic the social
context of order-sharing in the clubs. In addition, individuals who rely more on their club and are
more involved might feel differently about certain measures of success (i.e. overall club
function) than those who operate less frequently or are less invested.
Table 2.6. Control Variable Summary Statistics.
Control Variable

N

Mean

Median

SD

Min

Max

Age

157

51

50

13

22

79

HH income ($K)

140

69

65

34

2

150

% HH needs met
Gender

159
31
29
21
1
100
156 141 F (90%), 14 M (9%), 1 other (0.6%)

Table 2.7. Summary of HLM Results11.
Ind.
variable

Dep.
variable

Effect
size

p-value

% variance
explained
by club12

LRT

3A

NR

DG

0.00

0.70

0

0.00

3A

NR

PGG

0.00

0.86

0

0.00

3B

NR

Function

0.04

0.64

15

4.55*

3C

Club age

NR

0.42

0.19

3

0.23

3C

Club size

NR

0.58**

0.01

0

0.00

Prediction

11
12

See Appendix C for full regression tables.
Variance explained by club divided by total variance
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Table 2.7 continued.
4A

# rules

DG

-0.20

0.20

13

4.59*

4A

# rules

PGG

0.06

0.70

3

0.34

4B

# rules

Function

2.81*

0.08

7

2.29

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01
Evidence for P1: Buying Club Members Will Be Cooperative Toward Their Groups
The self-interested Nash Equilibrium strategy predicted by rational choice in this game is
a donation of zero. Instead, donations in the dictator game tend to be clustered around the median
($4) and the max ($8). The range of average donations in this game was $4-$6. Clubs B1 and B7
had the largest spread of data points from $0-$8. The mean donation was $4.67, or 58 percent of
total endowment. Donations in the public goods game had a much larger spread, with most clubs
exhibiting the full range from $0-$8. Overall, these data vary greatly in comparison to the
dictator game donations, but all groups followed the general trend of donations clustering at the
max. The mean donation in the public goods game was $5.61, or 70 percent of total endowment.
These results, in combination with the findings from the meta-analysis, demonstrate that the
buying club members in this study do behave cooperatively toward their groups. The analyses of
game donations provide strong support for P1.
Evidence for P2: Buying Club Members Will Exercise Reciprocity in Order-Sharing
In the scatterplot of NR by club, points tended to be clustered around 0 (balanced
reciprocity) with a good number of points from all groups dropping well below into the negative
range (altruistic behavior). Only a handful of points landed in the positive range (free-riding
behavior) from five clubs (B2, B2, B3, B5, and F1). Overall, people tended to report being
altruists more frequently than being free-riders. The mean NR across survey respondents was
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–10.60, and the standard deviation was 24.42. On average people reported that they exercise
relatively balanced reciprocity, with a slight tendency to report giving more than receiving.
These results indicate that clubs do exercise reciprocity in order-sharing, and that it varies
between individuals and between clubs.
Evidence for 3A: Reciprocity Will Reduce Altruism & Support Cooperation
In order to estimate the effect of reciprocity on altruism (DG) and cooperation (PGG), I
estimate the effect of individual reciprocity (NR) on dictator and public goods game donations,
controlling for age, income, gender, and percent of household needs met through the club, and
allow intercepts to vary by club (see Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2). NR was not a significant
predictor of donations in either game. For the both models of game donations, zero percent of the
variance in the data can be explained by variation across clubs, and grouping by club does not
significant predict game donations. These results do not provide any support for prediction 3A.
Evidence for 3B: Reciprocity Will Promote Club Functionality
I estimate an HLM of club overall function explained by percent of household needs met
through the club and NR (see Appendix Table C.3). NR was not found to be a significant
predictor of overall club function. Roughly 15 percent of the variation in club function can be
explained by differences in between clubs, and grouping by club ID is a significant predictor of
club function (LRT=4.55, p=0.03). These results do not support prediction 3B.
Evidence for 3C: Older Clubs Will Be More Reciprocal
In order to examine the relationship between club age and reciprocity, I estimate an HLM
of individual reciprocity (NR) as explained by percent of household needs met through the club
and club age in years (see Appendix Table C.4). Club age was not found to be a significant
predictor of reciprocity ratio, and 3.28 percent of the variance in reciprocity can be explained by
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differences across groups. The LRT result shows that grouping by club ID is not a significant
predictor of reciprocity. Results do not provide support for prediction 3C.
While club age may not be a significant predictor of reciprocity, club size may be. Club
and age size are positively correlated, and it is likely that larger club size makes order-sharing
easier by increasing the variety of preferences in the group. I estimate an HLM of NR explained
by club size and controlling for % HH needs met (see Appendix Table C.5), and found that club
size is a significant positive predictor of NR (effect size=0.58, p=0.01). Grouping by club ID did
not change results or explain additional variation.
Evidence for 4A: Rules Will Reduce Altruism & Support Cooperation
Qualitative results support the prediction that more formally organized clubs tend to
express less altruism and more cooperation than informal clubs. Quotes are chosen from
interviews and online surveys to highlight trends identified across groups, and are generally
representative of those groups. The informal clubs in this study are primarily operated by
coordinators, who run the groups with little or no contributions from members. When asked
about member contributions, one coordinator said, “because the club is small, I don’t mind doing
all the work." Another coordinator said that work tasks were not fairly distributed among
members, but might be “if the club got larger” since “there is not enough work to be spread
among members.” Many coordinators of informal groups admitted that they would like more
help from members, since they tend to do all of the work and make all decisions regarding club
operation. Coordinators of clubs with formal rules and norms told a very different story. When
asked about member contributions, they gave responses like “everybody is required to do
something, and does their job” and “it’s not hard to get people to [contribute]. There are no
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problems with free-riders.” These more formal clubs are highly cooperative, soliciting help from
all members to run the groups rather than relying on the altruism of a few individuals.
To measure the effect of rules adopted on individual measures of cooperation, I estimate
two HLMs of dictator and public goods game donations regressed on number of rules adopted
and control for age, income, gender, and percent of household needs met through the club (see
Appendix Tables C.6 and C.7). Number of rules adopted was not found to be a significant
predictor of donations in either game. Between-group variation explains 13.26 percent of
variation in dictator game donations, and club ID grouping was reported as significant
(LRT=4.59, p=0.032). Between-group variation explains 3.18 percent of variation in public
goods game donations, and was not a significant predictor of donations. These results do not
provide support for prediction 4A, and are in apparent disagreement with qualitative data.
Evidence for 4B: Rules Will Promote Club Functionality
Qualitative results from surveys and interviews support the prediction that rules promote
club functionality. While some coordinators of informal groups are happy to altruistically
provide services to others, or so invested in the club that they are willing to “do whatever it takes
to make it happen,” others have become frustrated with the lack of support. One coordinator
explained that running the club without any help from members is causing them to lose their
patience and “weed out less reliable members.” Another coordinator said, “although I take care
of all facets of the club…I wish my members were able to be more involved.” The coordinators
aren’t the only ones who recognize this problem; many members of informal clubs wish to be
more involved in their clubs. One respondent said, “I wish there was more opportunity for more
participation in the workload, […] or that the coordinator would get some financial benefit from
doing all the work.” Other members admitted feeling guilty, saying things like “I feel bad that
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the responsibility of ordering, collecting money, and sorting food falls primarily on just one
person.” Many respondents expressed concern about the future of their group. One member
worries that “if a few key helpers/coordinators could not do it any longer, the buying club would
not function well.” Coordinators and members of clubs with more rules said things like, “I’m
very satisfied,” “I love my club,” and “our club rocks.”
Table 2.8. Interview & Survey Quotes About Club Functionality.
# of rules
adopted

What members & coordinators say

2 rules

“There is no decision making or almost any volunteer contribution besides my
own. I am not sure why I am continuing to do this unpaid job.”
“Members need to contribute more. The same people always help.”
“[Running the club] is a big pain.”

3 rules*

“It was all me [doing the work], especially by the end.”

1 rule

4 rules
5 rules
6 rules

“For the most part members carry their weight.”
“I have yet to come across anything that is not well thought out and executed.
[…] the club is much better organized and run than any other groups we belong
to.”
“Everybody steps up […] it seems like people feel a sense of responsibility.”
“I love my club. I don’t need it for many things, but I would really miss having
it around. [The coordinator] does an excellent job!”
“I love my club” and “I’m very satisfied”
*dead club

To estimate the effect of number of rules adopted on club functionality, I estimate a HLM
of club overall function explained by number of rules adopted, and controlling for % HH needs
met through the club (see Appendix Table C.8). Number of rules adopted was found to be a
positive significant predictor of overall function (effect size=2.81, p=0.08). Only 6.83 percent of
the variation in club function can be explained by differences in between clubs, so grouping by
club ID is not a significant predictor of club function.
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Evidence for 4C: Rules Will Help Clubs Survive
To test the effect of number of rules adopted on club age, I estimate a univariate OLS
regression of the form 𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑥 + 𝜀, where 𝑌 is club age in years and 𝑥 is the number of rules
adopted in a club (see Appendix Table C.9). Number of rules had a significant effect on club age
(effect=3.33, p=0.00). However, this model is limited to only 12 degrees of freedom. To obtain a
more robust result, I conducted a bootstrap analysis on this model with 1000 iterations. Bootstrap
results indicate that number of rules is a significant predictor of club age, with an additional rule
increasing club age by about 3.34 years (p=0.00). The 95% confidence interval for this effect
size was 2.5–4.3.
For this prediction, causation is difficult to prove. I cannot be certain whether rules cause
clubs to survive longer (adaptation), or longer-living clubs have more experience and
opportunity to adopt rules (learning). The data is consistent with both of these predictions, and I
expect that in reality, a combination of both is at play in the evolution of buying clubs.
Summary of Results
Overall, results indicate that buying club members are cooperative toward their groups,
and do exercise reciprocity in order-sharing. Model results indicate that the only variables by
which a significant proportion of the variance can be explained by group differences include
overall club function (P3B: reciprocity will promote functionality), and dictator game donations
(P4A: rules will reduce the need for altruism). For the other models, results did not vary
significantly between groups. NR was not found to be a significant predictor of game donations
or club function. Club age was not a significant predictor of individual NR, but club size was.
The number of rules adopted was not a significant predictor of game donations, but was a
significant predictor of overall club function. Overall, results suggest that group-level variables
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don’t generally appear to be strong predictors of individual-level outcomes in all cases, except
for in the case of club size being positively associated with NR, and number of rules adopted
being positively associated with overall club function. The number of rules adopted was also
found to be significantly positively associated with club age.
Study Limitations
There are a handful of limitations important to note in this study. First, there may be a
considerable amount of bias impacting survey results. This research does not obtain a random
sample of buying clubs. The non-random sample makes it difficult to generalize results to larger
populations (e.g. buying clubs in the U.S.). Also, while response rates for groups were fairly
high, it is likely that self-selection bias may impact responses, where more cooperative members
may have chosen to partake over those less cooperative. This bias has the potential to inflate
measures of cooperation including experimental games. In addition, many questions were left
unanswered or partially answered in the survey, leaving gaps in the data and making it difficult
to obtain a complete picture of the individuals in the clubs. Finally, it is possible that the
measures of reciprocity in the online survey could be influenced by self-serving bias, the
tendency to see oneself in an overly favorable light (Myers, 2015). It would be useful to compare
individuals’ reported measures of reciprocity to what is observed in their purchasing history,
which would help lend some insight into this question of biased survey responses.
Second, this thesis does not formally analyze the qualitative data collected, but rather
treats it as a supplement to the quantitative data examined. Qualitative interview and survey
responses provide key insights and supporting material for quantitative results, but some data
(e.g. number of rules adopted) can be difficult to quantify. Further, the number of rules might not
always be as important as the type of rule and the extent to which it is enforced or not. For
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instance, a rule that requires members to pick up their order on time might not have the same
effect on coopertation as one that requires members to complete their work task.
Finally, the sample used in this research is relatively small, with only 14 buying clubs
and 177 individuals represented in the dataset. Consequently, the analyses conducted here have
limited statistical power. A larger, random sample would provide more robust results.
Discussion & Conclusions
Overall, results provided general support for predictions 1, 2, and 4, and findings were
consistent across data collection instruments. Buying club members were found to behave
cooperatively toward their groups, and exercise reciprocity in order-sharing. Reciprocity was not
found to be a strong predictor of cooperation, altruism, overall function, or club survival, and is
likely not an adaptation as I had originally predicted. However, free-riding (receiving more than
giving in splits) appears to be more common in larger clubs, wheras smaller clubs tended to have
more instances of altruism (receiving less than giving). These results suggest that club size may
free up constraints on individual altruists, likely by expanding and diversifying preferences
within the group. Reciprocity may not be an adaptation in the sense that more reciprocity helps
clubs succeed or survive, but may be a key metric to determine whether clubs are faced with a
dangerous reliance on altruism or free-ridership, both of which can cause long-term problems for
groups.
Qualitative and quantitative evidence provide general support for the prediction that rules
will help clubs succeed. While rule adoption doesn’t appear to be correlated with individual
game behavior, clubs with more rules reported significantly higher functionality. Rule adoption
also had a small singificant effect on club age, suggesting that rules may help clubs survive.
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Overall, rules appear to be an important aspect of buying club evolution, whether they represent
more of an adaptive process or are an example of institutional learning.
Institutional Adaptations & Organizational Change in Buying Clubs
This thesis presents evidence relevant to specific predictions regarding cooperation in
buying clubs and the mechanisms that sustain it. These results provide general support for my
overarching adaptive hypothesis of buying clubs, and may be used to refine and enhance the
evolutionary model, shaping future research. Evidence collected across all sources in this study
suggests strongly that buying clubs are cooperatively-structured organizations which require
members to cooperate with one another, both economically and organizationally. This reliance
on cooperation is tightly connected to many of the challenges clubs face, including sharing bulk
orders, reaching order minimums, fairly distributing labor, and others. The availability of more
convenient food vendors makes buying club membership a costly undertaking, which makes
clubs less resilient in the face of harsh economic conditions and exogenous shocks (e.g. loss of a
meeting space, loss of a key member or coordinator, etc.). Thus, clubs which are able to
overcome the challenges of order-sharing and organization likely possess certain adaptations that
support cooperation. This research found support for rule adoption as an institutional adaptation,
but not reciprocity. Smaller clubs in this study tended to rely more on the generous acts of
individual altruists to fill bulk orders, whereas larger clubs offered enough flexibility for
individuals to actually free-ride on the benefits of the group. Hence, it is possible that the
relevant adaptation is club size, which eases the presssures of order-sharing. Size will likely
become an important variable in future projects concerned with cooperation and the
organizational evolution of buying clubs. A refined version of the original adaptive hypothesis
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may focus on rule adoption and club size as two key adaptations that help clubs succeed and
survive.
Applications for Buying Clubs
There are a number of key takeaways from this research relevant to the organization and
management of food buying clubs. One of the major patterns that emerged in survey and
interview responses was the challenge of maintaining group membership. Clubs often struggle to
recruit a sufficient number of motivated and reliable members to ensure that orders are filled,
splits are possible, and work tasks are evenly distributed without overburdening coordinators.
When asked about an optimal group size for their club, many coordinators provided a number
between 20 and 25 people, yet the average size of the clubs in this study population is 15. Group
size is also a determinant of reciprocity. Having a sufficient group size is key for sustaining
cooperation and reducing reliance on altruistic individuals in buying clubs.
Another characteristic that supports cooperation and reduces the burden on individual
altruists in buying clubs is the adoption of rules. Many coordinators who manage all aspects of
their clubs expressed frustration, and members of these groups often admitted to feeling guilty
about not contributing or wishing they could be more involved. The adoption of rules in a buying
club can help disperse responsibility across members by holding them accountable for paying on
time, placing regular orders, attending meetings, performing work tasks, and participating in
whatever capacity is needed to keep the group running smoothly. These rules differ depending
on the size, schedule, and organization of the club, and should be designed to suit a club’s
particular needs. Some of the older clubs in the study have experienced periods of struggle,
which ultimately led to a change in leadership, organization, or rules, allowing the clubs to adapt
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and succeed. The ability to learn from mistakes and challenges and be fluid enough to make
necessary changes appears to be an important determinant of club success and longevity.
Future Research
One limitation of this study is that it does not differentiate club rules by type. Future
projects might explore how the type of rule adopted by clubs influences outcomes both at the
individual group level. Creating an index of rules and categorizing them by type and level of
formality may provide further insight into how rules emerge, evolve, and impact club success.
Finally, there is a large amount of data excluded from this analysis that could be integrated in
creative ways. For instance, future work might compare survey and interview results with social
network statistics derived from club purchasing history to capture the intricacies of ordersharing. Variables measured in the online surveys and interviews also remain to be analyzed,
including measures of how closely clubs integrate rules similar to Ostrom’s institutional design
principles. Other variables measured that were not analyzed in this thesis but may be of interest
include frequency of splits failing due to lack of support, changes in food preferences due to
experience in the club, hours worked for the club, costs and benefits of participating in the club,
and decision-making structure of the club.

55

REFERENCES
Abbate, L. (2018, December 12). Midcoast communities gear up for plastic bag, Styrofoam bans.
Bangor Daily News. Retrieved from
https://bangordailynews.com/2018/12/12/news/midcoast/midcoast-communities-gear-upfor-plastic-bag-styrofoam-bans/
An Act to Recognize Local Control Regarding Food Systems, L.D. 725 § (2017).
Apicella, C. L., Marlowe, F. W., Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2012). Social networks and
cooperation in hunter-gatherers. Nature, 481(7382), 497–501.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature10736
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211(4489),
1390–1396. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7466396
Barnett, W. P., & Hansen, M. T. (1996). The Red Queen in organizational evolution. Strategic
Management Journal, 17, 139–157. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250171010
Bayly, J. (2017, June 22). LePage signs food sovereignty law, the first of its kind in the nation.
Bangor Daily News. Retrieved from
https://bangordailynews.com/2017/06/20/homestead/lepage-signs-food-sovereignty-lawthe-first-of-its-kind-in-the-nation/
Birchall, J., & Ketilson, L. H. (2009). Resilience of the cooperative business model in times of
crisis. International Labour Organisation.
Blume, L., & Easley, D. (2008). Rationality. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd
ed.). Retrieved from http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~leb/rat03.pdf
Buckley, E., & Croson, R. (2006). Income and wealth heterogeneity in the voluntary provision of
linear public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 90(4), 935–955.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.06.002
Burger, K. (2017, December 19). How to Earn Cash from Your Kitchen. Retrieved December
28, 2018, from Next Avenue website: https://www.nextavenue.org/earn-cash-kitchen/
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. New
York, N.Y. : Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Cook, M. L., & Iliopoulos, C. (2016). Generic solutions to coordination and organizational costs:
informing cooperative longevity. Journal on Chain and Network Science, 16(1), 19–27.
Craig, B., & Pencavel, J. (1992). The Behavior of Worker Cooperatives: The Plywood
Companies of the Pacific Northwest. The American Economic Review, 82(5), 1083–1105.
56

Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of Species: By Means of Natural Selection, Or, the
Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. New York, NY: Appleton.
Davis, D. D., & Holt, C. A. (1993). Experimental economics. Princeton University Press.
Day-Farnsworth, L., McCown, B., Miller, M., & Pfeiffer, A. (2009). Scaling Up: Meeting the
Demand for Local Food. University of Wisconsin-Extension and Center for Integrated
Agricultural Systems, 40.
Dowling, J. (2013, April 1). Guild Statement Related To Local Food Ordinances. Retrieved May
3, 2019, from Maine Cheese Guild website: https://mainecheeseguild.org/?p=1191
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1998). Are Women Less Selfish Than Men?: Evidence From
Dictator Experiments. The Economic Journal, 108(448), 726–735.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00311
Engel, C. (2011). Dictator games: a meta study. Experimental Economics, 14(4), 583–610.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7
Food Freedom Act-Amendments, Pub. L. No. 17LSO-0441, HB0129 (2017).
Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA). , Pub. L. No. 111–353 (2011).
Friedman, G. (2014). Workers without Employers: Shadow Corporations and the Rise of the Gig
Economy. Review of Keynesian Economics, 2(2), 171–188.
Fulton, M. E. (1990). Individual and Collective Interests in Co-operatives, in: Co-Operative
Organizations and Canadian Society: Popular Institutions and the Dilemmas of Change.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Gintis, H. (2014). The bounds of reason: game theory and the unification of the behavioral
sciences (Revis;REV-Revis;).
Gowdy, J., & Baveye, P. (2018). An Evolutionary Perspective on Industrial and Sustainable
Agriculture. Forthcoming in: Agro-Ecosystem Diversity: Reconciling Contemporary
Agriculture and Environment Quality.
Gupta, C. (2014). The co-operative model as a ‘living experiment in democracy.’ Journal of CoOperative Organization and Management, 2(2), 98–107.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcom.2014.09.002
Hahn, M. W., & Bentley, R. A. (2003). Drift as a mechanism for cultural change: an example
from baby names. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological
Sciences, 270(suppl_1). https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2003.0045

57

Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.162.3859.1243
Harlow, D. (2013, June 2). Young farmers invigorating Maine agriculture. Kennebec Journal
and Morning Sentinel. Retrieved from https://www.centralmaine.com/2013/06/02/youngfarmers-invigorating-maine-agriculture/
Henrich. (2015). The secret of our success: how culture is driving human evolution,
domesticating our species, and making us smarter. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., & McElreath, R. (2001). In
Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies. The
American Economic Review, 91(2), 73–78. https://doi.org/10.2307/2677736
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The Weirdest People in the World?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2–3), 61–83.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0999152X
Herrmann, R. O. (1993). The Tactics of Consumer Resistance: Group Action and Marketplace
Exit. Advances in Consumer Research, 20.
Hesser, L. F., & Carter, J. (2006). The Man Who Fed the World: Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
Norman Borlaug and His Battle to End World Hunger: An Authorized Biography.
(Generic).
Hodgson, G. M., & Knudsen, T. (2010). Darwin’s conjecture: the search for general principles
of social and economic evolution.
Hoppe, R. A., MacDonald, J. M., Korb, P., & United States. Department of
Agriculture.Economic Research Service. (2010). Small farms in the United States:
persistence under pressure. no. 63.(Generic).
Hupper, A. (2017). The Role of Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior in Food Buying Clubs: An
Exploratory Study (Honors Thesis). University of Maine, Orono, Maine.
ICA. (2015). Guidance Notes to the Co-operative Principles.
Ikerd, J. (2012). Cooperation: The key to sustainable livelihoods in food systems. Journal of
Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community Development, 3(1), 9–11.
Iles, A., & Marsh, R. (2012). Nurturing Diversified Farming Systems in Industrialized Countries:
How Public Policy Can Contribute. Ecology and Society, 17(4), 42.
https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-05041-170442
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1986). Fairness and the Assumptions of
Economics. The Journal of Business, 59(4), S285-300.
58

Kraft-Todd, G., Yoeli, E., Bhanot, S., & Rand, D. (2015). Promoting cooperation in the field.
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 3, 96–101.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.02.006
Kurtz, H. E. (2015). Scaling Food Sovereignty: Biopolitics and the Struggle for Local Control of
Farm Food in Rural Maine. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 105(4),
859–873. https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2015.1022127
Lamba, S., & Mace, R. (2011). Demography and ecology drive variation in cooperation across
human populations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(35), 14426.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1105186108
Lang, T., Barling, D., & Caraher, M. (2001). Food, Social Policy and the Environment: Towards
a New Model. Social Policy & Administration, 35(5), 538–558.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9515.t01-1-00252
Leider, S. D., Mobius, M. M., Rosenblat, T., & Quoc-Anh, D. (2009). What do we expect from
our friends? Retrieved from
https://mercury.smu.edu.sg/rsrchpubupload/15345/ExpectFriends.pdf
Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance (Template), (2017).
Low, S. A. (2015, March 19). Farmers’ markets, other local food marketing channels show
strong growth. Retrieved April 24, 2019, from United States Department of Agriculture
Economic Research Service website: https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chartgallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=78076
Lund, M. (2011). Some field observations on the applicability of Elinor Ostrom’s work to
contemporary cooperative practice. Grassroots Economic Organizing (GEO), 2(9).
Maine Food Strategy. (2014, May). Maine Food Strategy Consumer Food Survey. Retrieved
from http://mainefoodstrategy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/maine-food-strategysconsumer-survey-report.pdf
Mapping Food Sovereignty. (2018). Retrieved January 5, 2019, from LocalFoodRules.org
website: http://localfoodrules.org/mapping-food-sovereignty/
Martinez, S. (2010). Local Food Systems; Concepts, Impacts, and Issues. DIANE Publishing.
McDonald, J. (2017, December). Flour Power: How cottage food entrepreneurs are using their
home kitchens to become their own bosses. Retrieved January 4, 2019, from Institute for
Justice website: https://ij.org/report/cottage-foods-survey/
McMichael, P. (2014). Historicizing food sovereignty. Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(6), 933–
957. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2013.876999
59

Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A., & Laland, K. N. (2004). Perspective: Is Human Cultural Evolution
Darwinian? Evidence Reviewed from the Perspective of “The Origin of Species.”
Evolution, 58(1), 1–11.
Morris, A. (2011, December 31). The Cottage Food Law. The Fine Print. Retrieved from
http://thefineprintmag.org/the-cottage-food-law/
Myers, D. G. (2015). Exploring Social Psychology (7th ed.). New York: McGraw Hill
Education.
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (2002). Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics. The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 16(2), 23–46. https://doi.org/10.1257/0895330027247
New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann. , 285 U.S. 262 (United States Supreme Court March 21, 1932).
Nilsson, J. (2001). Organisational principles for co-operative firms. Scandinavian Journal of
Management, 17(3), 329–356. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0956-5221(01)00010-0
Norenzayan, A., Henrich, J., & Heine, S. J. (2010). Most people are not WEIRD. Nature,
466(7302), 29–29. https://doi.org/10.1038/466029a
Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 314(5805), 1560–
1563. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1133755
Nowell, C., & Tinkler, S. (1994). The influence of gender on the provision of a public good.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25(1), 25–36.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(94)90084-1
Okasha, S. (2006). Evolution and the levels of selection.
Oosterveer, P., Sonnenfeld, D. A., & Sonnenfeld, D. A. (2012). Food, Globalization and
Sustainability. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781849776790
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E., & Janssen, M. A. (2005). Multi-Level Governance and Resilience of SocialEcological Systems. In M. Spoor (Ed.), Globalisation, Poverty and Conflict: A Critical
“Development” Reader (pp. 239–259). https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-2858-X_13
Paciotti, B., Richerson, P., Baum, B., Lubell, M., Waring, T., McElreath, R., … Edsten, E.
(2011). Are Religious Individuals More Generous, Trusting, and Cooperative? An
Experimental Test of the Effect of Religion on Prosociality. The Economics of Religion:
Anthropological Approaches, 31, 267–305.

60

Pan, X., & Houser, D. (2011). Mating Strategies and Gender Differences in Pro-sociality: Theory
and Evidence. CESifo Economic Studies, 57(4), 653–682.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifr020
Patel, R. (2009). Food sovereignty. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(3), 663–706.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150903143079
Piattoni, S. (2009). Multi-level Governance: a Historical and Conceptual Analysis. Journal of
European Integration, 31(2), 163–180. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330802642755
Piff, P. K., Kraus, M. W., Côté, S., Cheng, B. H., & Keltner, D. (2010). Having less, giving
more: The influence of social class on prosocial behavior. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 99(5), 771–784. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020092
Pimbert, M. (2009). Towards Food Sovereignty. Gatekeeper (International Institute for
Environment and Development). Retrieved from
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/5851/14855IIED.pdf?sequence=1.
Pingali, P. (2012). Green Revolution: Impacts, limits, and the path ahead. PNAS.
Policy Surveillance Program Staff. (2017, September 1). Cottage Foods. Retrieved January 3,
2019, from Law Atlas website: http://lawatlas.org/datasets/cottage-foods
Pollan, M. (2006). The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals.
Pols, M. (2018, January 9). UMaine System 2 years ahead of its goal of sourcing 20 percent of
its food locally. Portland Press Herald. Retrieved from
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/01/09/umaine-system-2-years-ahead-of-its-goal-ofsourcing-20-percent-of-its-food-locally/
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013). Human cooperation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(8),
413–425. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003
Renting, H., Schermer, M., & Rossi, A. (2012). Building food democracy: Exploring civic food
networks and newly emerging forms of citizenship. International Journal of Sociology of
Agriculture and Food, 19(3), 289–307.
Rice, C., Leib, E. B., & Balkus, O. (2018). Cottage Food Laws in the United States. Retrieved
from Harvard Law School Food Law and Policy Clinic website:
https://www.chlpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/FLPC_Cottage-FoodsReport_August-2018.pdf
Rieger, M., & Mata, R. (2015). On the generality of age differences in social and nonsocial
decision making. The Journals of Gerontology. Series B, Psychological Sciences and
Social Sciences, 70(2), 202–212. https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbt088

61

Shipan, C., & Volden, C. (2006). Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion of Antismoking Policies
from U.S. Cities to States. American Journal of Political Science, 50(4), 825–843.
Shiva, V. (2005). Earth democracy: justice, sustainability, and peace.
Sibilla, N. (2019, January 22). Hundreds Of Homemade Food Businesses Flourish Under State
Food Freedom Laws. Retrieved April 23, 2019, from Forbes website:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2019/01/22/hundreds-of-homemade-foodbusinesses-flourish-under-state-food-freedom-laws/
SNAP in the Farm Bill. (n.d.). Retrieved April 24, 2019, from Snap to Health website:
https://www.snaptohealth.org/farm-bill-usda/snap-in-the-farm-bill/
St. Peter, B. (2011, Winter). Local Food, Local Rules: Maine towns prepare to introduce
landmark local food ordinances. Saving Seeds, pp. 4–5.
Starmer, E. (2017, January 11). USDA Offers Grants to Help Expand Marketing and Local Food
Opportunities. Retrieved April 24, 2019, from U.S. Department of Agriculture website:
https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2017/01/11/usda-offers-grants-help-expand-marketingand-local-food-opportunities
State of Maine v. Dan Brown, Han-13-345 (Maine Supreme Judicial Court June 17, 2014).
Stephenson, P. (2013). Twenty years of multi-level governance: ‘Where Does It Come From?
What Is It? Where Is It Going?’ Journal of European Public Policy, 20(6), 817–837.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.781818
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2016). Small groups and long memories promote cooperation.
Scientific Reports, 6(1), 26889. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep26889
Strout, N. (2018, July 11). Bill to require state institutions to buy local foods becomes law.
Kennebec Journal and Morning Sentinel. Retrieved from
https://www.centralmaine.com/2018/07/11/bill-to-require-state-institutions-to-buy-localfoods-becomes-law/
Tan, J. H. W., & Bolle, F. (2007). Team competition and the public goods game. Economics
Letters, 96(1), 133–139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.031
Tews, K. (2005). The diffusion of environmental policy innovations: cornerstones of an
analytical framework. European Environment, 15(2), 63–79.
https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.378
Tews, K., Busch, P.-O., & Jörgens, H. (2003). The diffusion of new environmental policy
instruments. European Journal of Political Research, 42(4), 569–600.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00096
62

The Maine Food Sovereignty Act. (n.d.). Retrieved December 18, 2018, from Local Food
RULES website: http://localfoodrules.org/the-maine-food-sovereignty-act/
Thompson, J. J., & Gaskin, J. (2018). An Extension Specialist’s Reflections from the Field:
Discovering Ag of the Middle in the Shift from Direct Sale to Wholesale Vegetable
Production. Culture, Agriculture, Food and Environment, 40(2), 124–129.
https://doi.org/10.1111/cuag.12220
Tremblay, E. (2017). Splitting Together: The Evolution of Cooperation in Food Buying Clubs
(The University of Maine). Retrieved from
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd/2685
Tremblay, E., Hupper, A., & Waring, T. (2019). Consumer cooperatives harbor greater
generalized cooperation among food shoppers: Experimental economic evidence.
SocArXiv (Preprint). https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/6x9p3
Tremblay, E., & Waring, T. (2015). A Smiling Face Is Half The Meal: The Role of Cooperation
in Sustaining Maine’s Local Food Industry. Maine Policy Review, 23(2), 43–50.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology,
46(1), 35–57.
USDA. (2017, April 13). Beginning Farmers and Age Distribution of Farmers. Retrieved
December 17, 2018, from USDA Economic Research Service website:
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/beginning-disadvantagedfarmers/beginning-farmers-and-age-distribution-of-farmers/
Valigra, L. (2014, March 10). Food co-ops on the rise as Mainers seek local foods, buying
power. Retrieved June 16, 2014, from Mainebiz website:
http://www.mainebiz.biz/article/20140310/CURRENTEDITION/303069996/food-coops-on-the-rise-as-mainers-seek-local-foods-buying-power
Vilsack, T. (2016, April 4). New Markets, New Opportunities: Strengthening Local Food
Systems and Organic Agriculture. Retrieved December 27, 2018, from Medium website:
https://medium.com/usda-results/new-markets-new-opportunities-strengthening-localfood-systems-and-organic-agriculture-17b529c5ea90
Wadley, J. B. (1985). A View of Farmland Preservation From a Different Perspective. Gonzala
Law Review, 20(683). Retrieved from http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/assets/bibarticles/wadley_view.pdf
Waring, T., & Acheson, J. (2018). Evidence of cultural group selection in territorial lobstering in
Maine. Sustainability Science, 13(1), 21–34. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-017-0501-x

63

Waring, T., Kline, M., Brooks, J., Goff, S., Gowdy, J., Janssen, M., … Jacquet, J. (2015). A
multilevel evolutionary framework for sustainability analysis. Ecology and Society,
20(2). https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-07634-200234
Waring, T., & Lange, T. (2019). Do the ‘co-operative principles’ constitute institutional
adaptations? Retrieved from
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3322978
What is Food Sovereignty. (2013, August 14). Retrieved December 18, 2018, from Food Secure
Canada website: https://foodsecurecanada.org/who-we-are/what-food-sovereignty
Wickham, H., Francois, R., Henry, L., Müller, K., & RStudio. (2018). dplyr: A Grammar of Data
Manipulation (Version 0.7.8). Retrieved from http://dplyr.tidyverse.org
Wickham, H., Henry, L., & RStudio. (2018). tidyr: Easily Tidy Data with “spread()” and
“gather()” Functions (Version 0.8.2). Retrieved from https://tidyr.tidyverse.org/
Wickham, H., Hester, J., Francois, R., R), R. C. T. (Date time code adapted from, RStudio,
implementation), J. J. (grisu3, & implementation), M. J. (grisu3. (2018). readr: Read
Rectangular Text Data (Version 1.2.1). Retrieved from https://readr.tidyverse.org/
Wilson, David Sloan, & Gowdy, J. M. (2013a). Evolution as a general theoretical framework for
economics and public policy. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 90(Journal
Article), S3–S10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.008
Wilson, David Sloan, & Gowdy, J. M. (2013b). Evolution as a general theoretical framework for
economics and public policy. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 90(Journal
Article), S3–S10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.008
Wilson, David Sloan, & Wilson, E. O. (2007). Rethinking the theoretical foundation of
sociobiology. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 82(4), 327–348.
https://doi.org/10.1086/522809
Wilson, D.S., Elinor Ostrom, & Michael E. Cox. (2013). Generalizing the core design principles
for the efficacy of groups. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
Wittman, H., Desmarais, A., & Wiebe, N. (2010). Food Sovereignty - Reconnecting Food,
Nature and Community. Foodfirst.Org. Retrieved from
https://foodfirst.org/publication/food-sovereignty-reconnecting-food-nature-andcommunity/
Zelmer, J. (2003). Linear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta-Analysis. Experimental
Economics, 6, 299–310.

64

APPENDICES
Appendix A: Coordinator Interview Questions
University of Maine
Notice of Informed Consent
You are invited to participate in a research project lead by professor Tim Waring and student
researchers at the University of Maine. The project is a study of the challenges faced by food
buying clubs, and the solutions that groups have discovered. You must be at least 18 years of age
to participate.
What Will You Be Asked to Do? You will be asked to answer a series of questions regarding
the way your buying club operates.
Voluntary: Participation is voluntary; you may stop the interview at any time.
Confidentiality: Your responses will be treated confidentially, and will be encrypted for
security. Your email address and personal identifying information will never be published,
presented, or shared outside of the research team. Identifying information will be destroyed at the
end of the project (~5 years). Summary data (key findings, trends, themes etc.) will be shared
with Adi Fairbank (or Jeremy Bloom), and buying club participants, but no raw data will be
shared.
Risks: The only risks to participating in this experiment are the time and inconvenience of
participation.
Benefits: There are no direct benefits to you. The research will benefit society by improving our
understanding of food buying clubs and cooperation.
Compensation: There will be no compensation, monetary or otherwise, for your participation in
this interview.
Contact: If you have any questions about the research or its goals, please contact Afton Hupper
at afton.hupper@maine.edu or (207) 691-1786, Taylor Lange at
taylor.z.lange@maine.edu (607) 201-2441 or Dr. Waring at timothy.waring@maine.edu. Any
questions about your rights as a participant may be directed to Gayle Jones, Assistant to the
University of Maine’s Protection of Human Subjects, Institutional Review Board (IRB), at
gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu or by phone: (207) 581-1498.

65

Do you understand the risks and benefits, and agree to participate in this interview?
Introduction
Thanks for chatting with me today. We are a small research group at the University of Maine.
We are studying what makes food buying clubs successful Thank you for making this study
possible! We’ll let you know what we find. Today, I was hoping to learn a little more about your
group, and its history.
History
1. So, when did you become coordinator? [year]
2. What year was your club established? [year]
3. Please describe your group and how it works. [ex. club, farm, store, etc.]
4. How does your group use foodclub.org?
5. Can you give a basic timeline of the history of the club? Or, what are the biggest changes
the club has seen? [list of events and rough dates]
a. For each:
i.
What caused the change? [take notes]
ii.
What was the result of the change? [take notes]
Look for signs of changes in cooperation, rules, numbers
b. Are there any other major changes you can think of? [complete the list]
Group Function
Can you help me understand a little about how your group works?
6. How does your group coordinate orders? [verbal description]
Splits
Splitting bulk purchases is often a central part of what makes food clubs work.
1. Is splitting items important for your group? In other words, if you could not split
purchases, would the group still function?
2. What is the right amount of splitting (%) or this group? [is there a sweet spot?]
3. In your experience, is there a group size that works best? Please explain. [is this related
to item splitting?]
Cooperation & Contributions
Often, many types of work are needed to keep the club running smoothly.
4. What tasks or jobs are important to make the club run smoothly? [ex. bookkeeping,
hosting meetings, breaking down orders, organizing, etc.]
5. In your view, are these work tasks fairly distributed among members? [does the club have
a problem with “free-riders?”]
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Clearly defined boundaries
6. Are the members of your buying club well-defined? [e.g. is it clear who is a member and
who is not?]
7. Are there any requirements for members to join and/or stay in your club? [ex.
membership fees, ordering requirements, perform work tasks, etc.]
Congruence between rules and conditions
8. How formal are the rules of your group? [are they written down and enforced, or are they
informal social norms?]
9. Do members of your buying club generally follow the rules formulated by the group?
[order-sharing, contributing labor, organizing, helping you, etc.]
Collective-choice arrangements
10. When the group makes a change, how is it decided? [ex. new supplier, coordinator,
meting times, etc.] [look for hierarchical vs participatory]
11. Do members participate in making decisions regarding the organization and management
of the buying club?
Monitoring
In some groups, complying with any group rules and standards requires monitoring.
12. Does your group have any need to monitor behavior? If so, how is that done? [official
monitor, everyone monitors, not needed, other system, etc.]
Graduated sanctions
13. What happens if members violate these “rules”? Are sanctions or punishments imposed
on members if they violate the rules? [e.g. removal from the group, intervention, informal
discussion, etc.]
a. If so, do those sanctions or punishments vary depending on the seriousness or
context of the rule breaking? [e.g. graduated?]
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
14. What happens when there is a conflict between members or leaders? Is there any
procedure or routine for dealing with conflicts? [ex. informal discussion, intervention
etc.]
Rights to organize
15. Does the group have the freedom to organize as they see fit, or does is face external
constraints? [ex. laws/regulations, other institutional hurdles]
Challenges and Successes
16. What are some of the biggest challenges faced by your group, now and in the past?
17. What have been the biggest successes or breakthroughs your club has experienced?
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Thanks so much for your time! We will share our findings with you as soon as possible.
Cooperation Tools - Trial
I have one last question for you and your group.
We think that cooperation science can help food clubs thrive.
If you are interested, we could share some materials and ideas with your group on that.
18. Do you think you group would be interested?
a. If so, would it be okay for us to send your club a link to our online survey
designed for food buying clubs?
b. Since working with foodclub, we now have the opportunity to study your club’s
purchasing history to try to glean more information about your cooperative
purchasing behavior, would that be alright with you?
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Appendix B: Food Club Survey
University of Maine Notice of Informed Consent
You are invited to participate in a research project lead by professor Tim Waring and student
researchers at the University of Maine. The project is a study of the challenges faced by food
buying clubs, and the solutions that groups have discovered. You must be at least 18 years of age
to participate.
What Will You Be Asked to Do?
You will be asked to play two economic games with real money provided by the researcher,
some of which you will get to keep. You will also be asked to complete a survey about your
experience with your food buying club. In total this should take about 15 minutes.
Risks: The only risks to participating in this experiment are the time and inconvenience of
participation.
Compensation: The economic games provide monetary compensation ranging from $0 to $35,
depending on your choices in the game.
Confidentiality: Your responses will be treated confidentially, and will be encrypted for
security. You will be anonymous to other players in the economic games. You will be asked to
select your club ID from a list, and provide your email address so that we can compensate you.
Email addresses, club IDs and personal identifying information will never be published,
presented, or shared outside of the research team. Identifying information will be destroyed at the
end of the project (~5 years). Summary data (key findings, trends, themes etc.) will be shared
with foodclub.org, and buying club participants, but no raw data will be shared.
Benefits: There are no direct benefits to you. The research will benefit society by improving our
understanding of food buying clubs and cooperation.
Voluntary: Participation is voluntary. You may stop at any time. However, if you stop before
the end of the survey we will not be able to calculate your payment, or pay you.
Contact: If you have any questions about the research or its goals, please contact Afton Hupper
at afton.hupper@maine.edu or (207) 691-1786, Taylor Lange at
taylor.z.lange@maine.edu (607) 201-2441 or Dr. Waring at timothy.waring@maine.edu. Any
questions about your rights as a participant may be directed to Gayle Jones, Assistant to the
University of Maine’s Protection of Human Subjects, Institutional Review Board (IRB), at
gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu or by phone: (207) 581-1498.
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By continuing you signal that you understand the risks and benefits and agree to participate.
Thank you for taking time to fill out this survey.
Local Food Science is a collaborative research group at the University of Maine. We're working
to find the best solutions to the biggest challenges faced by food buying clubs. Your responses
are critical. We will share the results once your group has finished the survey. We hope they will
help!
After a required University research statement, the survey proceeds as follows:
Two paid economic games (2 min)
Buying club experiences (10 min)
Demographic information (3 min)
All together, it should take about 15 minutes to complete. We look forward to your input!
- The Local Food Science team
Economic Games
• First you will play two separate economic games.
• Your identity and responses will be completely confidential.
• You will be anonymous to other players, and they will be anonymous to you.
First Game
You are playing with: another person in your buying club.
• You have an endowment of $8.
• You may choose to contribute any whole-dollar amount ($0 to $8) to the other player.
• You will be paid the amount you chose to keep.
• The other player will be paid the amount you chose to contribute to them.
1. Use the slider to indicate how much, if any, you will contribute to another person in your
buying club.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Dollars contributed ()
Second Game
You are playing with the all other members of your buying club.
• You have an endowment of $8.
• You may choose to contribute any whole-dollar amount ($0 to $8) to a group fund.
• Every other player may choose to contribute to the group fund.
• The group fund will grow by 40%, then be divided equally between every member of the
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group, regardless of their individual contributions.
• You will be paid the amount you kept, plus your equal share of the final group fund.
• Every other player faces the same scenario as you.
2. Use the slider to indicate how much, if any, you contribute to your buying club's group
fund. Remember, the group fund will be increased 40% and divided evenly between all
members.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8

Dollars contributed ()
Thank you. Your choices have been recorded. We will calculate your payment once all responses
are recorded.
To make payment possible, you will be asked to provide your email address at the end of the
survey. If you fail to complete the survey and provide a correct email address, we will be unable
to pay you. Next, we ask a series of questions on your experience with your buying club.
3. When did you join your food buying club?
▼ 2018 (1) ... Before 1990 (70)
4. Prior to joining one, how did you first learn about food buying clubs?
5. What are your primary motivations for joining your buying club?
Select all that apply.
q

To save money on food

q

To gain access to certain foods

q

To meet health and dietary preferences

q

To support local producers

q

To support good environmental practices

q

To support good social practices

q

To avoid industrialized food

q

To socialize with club members

q

Due to familiarity with buying clubs

q

Due to personal connection or invitation

q

Other ________________________________________________
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6. What percent of your total household needs are met through your buying club?
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% of needs met ()
7. People in buying clubs often split big, bulk purchases.
Of your purchases:
None
0

Some

Half

Most

All

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

How many of your purchases require the
help of other club members to split? ()
How often do you receive the help you need
in splitting items? ()
8. How often do you initiate a split purchase that fails (due to lack of support)?
Never Sometimes About Most of Always
half the the time
time
0

25

50

75

100

Frequency of "failed" splits ()
9. Do you ever buy items that don't fit your own preferences in order to help someone fill a
shared purchase?
m

Yes

m

No

10. On average, what percent of your purchases don't match your own preferences, but help
others split bulk items?
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent of items ()

11. When you help others complete splits, how often do they reciprocate on average?
Never Sometimes Half of Most of Always
the time the time
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0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Frequency of reciprocity ()
12. What percent of members of your club typically reciprocate after they receive help
completing a split?
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% of members ()
13. Please select the types of foods that you purchase through the buying club. (Select all that
apply)
m

Organic

m

Fair trade

m

Non-GMO

m

Sustainably sourced

m

Rare, ethnic or specialty foods

m

Local food

m

Other ________________________________________________

14. Have your food preferences or habits changed due to your experience in the buying club?
If yes, please explain how.
m

Yes ________________________________________________

m

No

Participation
This section focuses on your participation in the buying club.
15. How many hours per week, on average, do you do work tasks for the buying club?
(Work tasks might include hosting deliveries, financial bookkeeping, scheduling or arranging
deliveries, etc.)
▼ 0 (1) ... More than 20 (11)
16. Please consider how your group functions.
Strongly Disagree Neutral
disagree
0
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25

50

Agree Strongly
Agree
75

100

My group communicates well. ()
Members contribute their fair share of the
work. ()
Members benefit from participating. ()
Members help each other complete bulk
purchases when needed. ()
My group functions well overall. ()
17. Please reflect on the various costs and benefits of participating in the buying
club. Participating...
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Disagree
Agree
0

25

50

75

100

... benefits me financially. ()
... costs me financially. ()
... benefits me socially. ()
... costs me socially. ()
OVERALL: Participation benefits outweigh
costs. ()
18. If your club operates on a set of "rules," do you view those rules as fair? Please explain your
answer.
m

Yes ________________________________________________

m

No ________________________________________________

m

We do not have any rules.

19. Please rank the accuracy of the following statements in terms of your buying club.
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Disagree
Agree
0
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25

50

75

100

I have a strong sense of belonging to the
buying club. ()
When I talk about the buying club, I usually
say "we" rather than "they." ()
The needs and wants of other members of the
buying club influence my needs and wants. ()
The buying club requires effort from all
members to function. ()

19. As a member of this buying club, are you included in group decisions? (i.e. changes in
suppliers, goals, rules, etc.)
Not at all Somewhat Partially Mostly Fully
0

25

50

75

100

I feel included in decisions ()
20. In general, how happy or satisfied are you with your group?
Very Unsatisfied Neutral Satisfied Very
Unsatisfied
satisfied
0

25

50

75

100

Level of satisfaction ()
20. Do you have unmet needs you wish the club could provide? If so, what changes would you
like to see?
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Demographic Information
The basic information provided in this section will be kept strictly confidential.
21. Please select your age.
▼ 18 (1) ... 100 (83)
22. What is your gender?

▼ Male (1) ... Prefer not to say (3)
75

23. Please describe your ethnicity by selecting all that apply.

q

White

q

Black or African American

q

Latino / Latina

q

American Indian or Alaska Native

q

Asian

q

Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander

q

Prefer not to say

q

Other

24. Please select your highest completed education level.
▼ Some high school ... PhD, JD, MD, etc.
25. What is your approximate annual household income?
More than 150K
0

15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150

Approximate annual household income (in
thousands) ()
26. Please select your employment status.
▼ Employed full time (1) ... Disabled (7)
27. How many dependents are in your household?
________________________________________________________________
foodclub.org
Please consider how your group uses foodclub.org to organize shared orders. Your responses
here will help improve foodclub.org.
28. How satisfied are you with foodclub.org's service?
Very Unsatisfied Neutral Satisfied Very
Unsatisfied
Satisfied
0
Satisfaction ()
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25

50

75

100

29. What do you appreciate about foodclub.org?
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
30. How could foodclub.org improve its service?
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Payment Details
One last step... electronic payment!
We use a free service called Square Cash to send your games payments electronically.
Square Cash Details:
- Square Cash is secure, fast, and will deposit the payment into your bank account.
- You will need a current debit card to accept the payment.
- You will receive an email from cash@square.com, with a link to accept the payment.
- You will have 14 days to accept the payment.
- The deposit will appear on your bank statement as “SQC*WARING” or “SQ*WARING”.
31. Please enter your email address below so we can send you your payment:
________________________________________________________________
You're all done! Thank you.
Your answers will help us better understand the best solutions buying clubs have found to their
hardest challenges. Once everyone has been able to complete the survey and games, and we have
analyzed them all, we will share the survey results with you and your club. We hope that the
findings will be interesting and useful!
Don't Forget:
**Look for an email from cash@square.com with instructions to accept your games
payment!**
- The Local Food Science Team
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Appendix C: Regression Tables

Table C.1. OLS Model of Net
Received Regressed on Dictator
Game Donation
Dependent
variable:
DG
Age
-0.292*
(0.173)
0.394**
(0.173)
-0.612
(0.631)
-0.290
(0.180)
-0.003
(0.008)
4.522***
(0.198)
96
-190.868
397.737

HH income
Gender (male)
% HH needs met
NR
Constant

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf.
418.252
Crit.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table C.2. OLS Model of Net Received
Regressed on Public Goods Game
Donation
Dependent variable:
PGG
Club age
-0.390
(0.245)
HH income
0.417*
(0.243)
Gender(Male)
0.263
(0.898)
% HH needs met
0.203
(0.248)
Net received
0.002
(0.011)
Constant
5.403***
(0.279)
Observations
97
Log Likelihood
-224.970
Akaike Inf. Crit.
465.939
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
486.537
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table C.3. OLS Model of Overall
Function Regressed on Net Received
Dependent variable:
% HH needs met
NR
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.

Overall function
0.905
(2.015)
0.037
(0.079)
80.580***
(3.200)
99
-430.975
871.949

Bayesian Inf. Crit.
884.925
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.4. OLS Model of Net Received
Regressed on Club Age
Dependent variable:
NR
% HH needs met
-3.104
(2.426)
Club age
1.031
(2.356)
Constant
-11.292***
(2.739)
Observations
108
Log Likelihood
-492.041
Akaike Inf. Crit.
994.081
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
1,007.492
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table C.5. OLS Model of Net
Received Regressed on Club Size
Dependent variable:
NR
% HH needs met
-0.230**
(0.101)
Number of
members

0.257***
(0.098)

Constant

-0.015
(0.093)
Observations
110
Log Likelihood
-156.123
Akaike Inf. Crit.
322.246
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
335.748
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table C.6. OLS Model of Dictator Game
Donation Regressed on Club Age
Dependent variable:
DG donation
Club age in years
-0.269*
(0.146)
HH income
0.413***
(0.155)
Gender (male)
0.387
(0.523)
Gender (other)
-2.750
(1.734)
% HH needs met

0.105
(0.162)
Rules
-0.202
(0.148)
Constant
5.366***
(0.567)
Observations
139
Log Likelihood
-273.113
Akaike Inf. Crit.
564.227
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
590.637
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table C.7. OLS Model of Public
Goods Game Donation Regressed
on Club Age
Dependent variable:
PGG
Age in years
-0.378*
(0.206)
HH income
0.212
(0.213)
Gender (male)
0.712
(0.739)
Gender (other)
-4.441*
(2.457)
% HH needs met
0.297
(0.219)
Rules
0.062
(0.157)
Constant
5.366***
(0.598)
Observations
140
Log Likelihood
-320.196
Akaike Inf. Crit.
658.391
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
684.866
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table C.8. OLS Model of Overall
Function Regressed on Rules
Dependent variable:
Overall function
% HH needs met
0.955
(1.737)
Rules
2.811**
(1.430)
Constant
70.768***
(5.536)
Observations
140
Log Likelihood
-610.703
Akaike Inf. Crit.
1,231.405
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
1,246.114
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.9. OLS Model of Club Age
Regressed on Rules
Dependent variable:
Club age (years)
Number of rules
3.333***
(0.499)
Constant
4.253**
(1.902)
Observations
164
2
R
0.216
2
Adjusted R
0.211
Residual Std. Error 10.131 (df = 162)
F Statistic
44.692*** (df = 1; 162)
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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